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 This dissertation examines industry self-regulation within the context of the global 
financial services sector. Increases in globalization and multinational enterprise (MNE) activity 
over the last few decades have created a need for global governance and coordinated industry 
standards across borders. The financial sector, in particular, is very integrated across borders, 
making the industry and national economies highly susceptible to crises and contagion if not 
regulated properly. However, national governments are limited in their ability to adequately 
regulate business activity adequately outside of their borders. Thus, the global financial sector 
has become substantially regulated under voluntary mechanisms including intergovernmental 
agreements on standards and best practices for supervision and regulation, as well as self-
regulation implemented by firms and industry associations. Researchers, practitioners, and 
policymakers continue to debate the effectiveness of self-regulation; however, this debate is 
quite muddled and convoluted, which has kept us from reaching a consensus, or at least a better 
understanding of the effectiveness of regulatory frameworks in which government and private 
actors are heavily involved. Using the context of the global financial services sector, this 
dissertation examines:  (1) how the study of industry self-regulation can be incorporated into 
international business (IB) research in order to increase our understanding of the phenomenon; 
(2) the nature of the relationship between industry government regulation and self-regulation; 
and (3) the effectiveness of self-regulation in responding to a major economic crisis and its 
effectiveness in attracting inward foreign direct investment (FDI). 
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 The first essay provides a review of the literature debating the effectiveness of 
designating regulatory authority of an industry to the government versus firms and other private 
sector individuals closely tied to the industry. Additionally, I bring this debate into the IB field 
by providing an example of how industry self-regulation research can be applied to IB research. 
Specifically, I nest the government- versus self-regulation discussion within the context of 
attracting inward FDI in the financial services sector. Finally, I propose a future research agenda 
for international business scholars in order to advance our understanding of industry self-
regulation, particularly in an international context. 
  The second essay presents an exploratory study that provides additional insights into the 
complex global regulatory environment by analyzing the relationship between government 
regulation and self-regulation, and by examining how each type of regulation responds to a 
major economic crisis. Empirical findings from this study indicate that: (1) there is no evidence 
of a causal relationship between government regulation and self-regulation; (2) there is no 
evidence of a complementary or substitutive relationship between government regulation and 
self-regulation; (3) government regulation tends to strengthen in response to a crisis; (4) self-
regulation tends to respond just as quickly (and perhaps quicker) to a crisis as government 
regulation; and (5) self-regulation tends to weaken in response to a crisis. 
 Lastly, the third essay examines the effect of the strength of various host country 
regulations on attracting inward FDI flows in the financial services sector. Specifically, I employ 
a multilevel analysis by testing the effects of regulations at the country and industry levels. 
Additionally, I examine the effects of differences in regulatory authority by testing the 
relationships between inward FDI and the strength of host country regulations under the 
authority of government actors and self-regulation. I find that host countries with weaker 
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national-level regulations and countries with stronger industry-level regulations under the 
authority of the government encourage FDI within the financial sector. However, self-regulation 
in the host country does not appear to have a significant effect on foreign investors’ decisions 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Self-regulation is defined by Gupta and Lad (1983) as a “…regulatory process whereby 
an industry-level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level organization…sets and enforces 
rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the industry” (p.417). The emergence of 
self-regulation on an international scale is largely attributed to globalization and an increase in 
business activities conducted by multinational enterprises (MNEs). As globalization occurred, 
MNEs became subject to threats from increased government-regulation and increased 
transnational activism regarding social issues (to which governments were not responding 
quickly) (Haufler, 2003). Therefore, the rise in business transactions conducted across borders 
created a need for global coordination and regulation, and subsequently, governing institutions 
with global reach (King, Prado, & Rivera, 2012).  
While one may predict that increased globalization would shift governance upward to 
supranational and intergovernmental levels, Eichengreen (2003) suggests that this neither is the 
only response, nor is it a likely one. Supranational and intergovernmental organizations typically 
reflect diverse views and find it difficult to agree on specific recommendations. Oftentimes, this 
leads to delays in regulatory actions, essentially forcing private industry participants to take 
matters into their own hands, as exchanges and communications would be very difficult without 
agreed upon standards (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). The highly global nature of some 
industries makes it quite difficult for government regulators to effectively regulate them 
effectively on a domestic and international level. This difficulty provides a strong case for 
international cooperation amongst private industry actors (Eichengreen, 2003). As such, public 
and private organizations have assumed roles in regulating business activities domestically and 
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internationally, which have resulted in the formation of a complex global regulatory environment 
(Abbot & Snidal, 2009; Vogel, 2010). 
 Scholars across various disciplines have made attempts to increase our understanding of 
this complex regulatory environment; however international business (IB) scholars have much 
work to do in examining and answering questions about these regulatory environments, firm 
behavior, and firm strategies on an international scale. MNEs must tackle the complexity of 
various regulations and regulators interacting simultaneously; yet, IB scholars have left the 
influences of multiple levels of regulations and multiple types of regulators largely understudied 
(Zhou & Peng, 2010). More research is needed in order to increase our understanding of how 
firms and other private organizations are incorporated into regulatory environments. Specifically, 
we lack understanding of the extent to which firms and governments complement or substitute 
each other in their regulatory efforts. 
 There is much debate across various disciplines surrounding the effectiveness of industry 
self-regulation in relation to government-regulation. Furthermore, there is debate regarding how 
much regulatory authority should be allocated between public and private organizations and 
actors. Since many modern industries engage in self-regulation (Barnett & King, 2008), it is 
important for researchers to delve deeper into the regulatory-related aspects of firms’ activities.  
 I address these limitations in the existing research on industry self-regulation using the 
context of the global financial services sector because it is appropriate and relevant. As a highly 
regulated industry, firms in the financial services sector are subject to various regulatory forces 
at the national and industry levels. Self-regulation, in particular, has traditionally played a 
sizeable role in governing the financial services sector (Eichengreen, 2003). Recently, self-
regulation has received a lot of blame for the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and its 
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contagion effects that persisted throughout Europe after the crisis subsided in the United States. 
Recent financial sector reforms in the U.S. and Europe included measures to reduce self-
regulation and mandate more standards and practices under the government’s oversight. 
Regulation is heavily debated in politics, and financial sector regulations have become 
increasingly political (Pagliari, 2012) given the impact that the financial sector has on 
governments, organizations, and individuals around the world.  
Financial sector FDI in particular (explored in Essay 3) is sensitive to changes in 
regulatory environments. The study of financial sector FDI is relevant because FDI in this sector 
helps foster financial sector development around the world (especially in developing countries), 
and plays a significant role in a country’s ability to attract, sustain, and reap the benefits of non-
financial sector FDI. Additionally, managers of financial sector firms have substantial interest in 
regulations, as these regulations, which heavily influence their business operations (Salomon & 
Wu, 2012). Nevertheless, the financial services sector remains underexplored in self-regulation 
research and management research in general. 
 Therefore, using the context of the global financial services sector, I examine the 
following broad research questions within three essays: (1) what insights has existing research 
presented regarding industry self-regulation and the self-regulation versus government-regulation 
debate? (2) How can the study of self-regulation in an international context be incorporated 
within the IB discipline? (3) What is the nature of the relationship between industry government-
regulation and self-regulation? (4) To what extent are self-regulation and government-regulation 
effective in responding to an economic crisis? (5) To what extent are government-regulation and 
self-regulation effective in attracting inward FDI? 
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 Essay 1 reviews the literature debating the effectiveness of government-regulation and 
industry self-regulation. This essay subsequently brings this debate into the IB discipline by 
providing an example of how industry self-regulation research can be applied to IB research. I 
then propose a future research agenda for IB scholars to advance our understanding of industry 
self-regulation in an international context. I journey along this proposed research agenda in the 
empirical studies in Essays 2 and 3.  
Essay 2 is an exploratory study that examines the nature of the relationship between 
industry government-regulation and self-regulation, as well as the effectiveness of each type of 
regulation when responding to a major economic crisis. While historical accounts and case 
studies suggest that self-regulation tends to precede government-regulation and that the two 
types of regulations may have complementary or substitutive relationships, there is a lack of 
rigorous quantitative empirical research to substantiate these claims. Many critics of industry 
self-regulation suggest that it may not be effective in adequately responding to crises strongly 
and quickly; however, we have little empirical evidence to corroborate these critiques. Therefore, 
I test these hypotheses using cross-national financial sector regulatory data and the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
Essay 3 examines the effect of the strength of various host country regulations on 
attracting inward FDI flows in the financial services sector. Although there is much debate 
regarding the extent to which the global economy benefits from regulations, it is largely unclear 
how the strength of regulations at different levels and the allocation of regulatory authority 
influence firms’ FDI. Therefore, in this essay, I test the effects of regulations at the country and 
industry levels on inward FDI. Additionally, I examine the effects of differences in regulatory 
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authority by testing the relationships between inward FDI and the strength of host country 
industry regulations under the authority of government actors and self-regulation. 
This dissertation contributes to the IB and self-regulation literatures by delineating how 
the study of self-regulation can be nested within IB and by suggesting various research streams 
for researchers to explore in order to increase our understanding of the regulatory activities of 
firms and other nongovernmental organizations. This dissertation also provides additional 
insights regarding the effectiveness of self-regulation (a highly debated topic) by investigating 
how effective it is in responding to crises and how effective it is in attracting FDI in the financial 
services sector. While this dissertation contributes to our understanding of self-regulation within 
the global financial services sector, which may give us an idea of how it works in other highly 
regulated industries, more research is needed to explore the phenomenon in other contexts. 
I provide a summary of the research questions, dependent variables, and independent 
variables in each essay (when applicable) in Table 1.1. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1.1 here 
------------------------------ 
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Table 1.1 Summaries of Three Dissertation Essays 
 
Essay Research Questions Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
Essay 1: Entering the Debate: The 
Effectiveness of Industry Self-
Regulation in the Context of Financial 
Sector Foreign Direct Investment 
What insights can be gathered from 
the existing debate on industry 
government-regulation and self-
regulation? How can international 
business scholars contribute to this 
debate? 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Essay 2: The Relationship Between 
Financial Sector Government-
Regulation and Self-Regulation and 
Their Response to the Global 
Financial Crisis 
To what extent does self-regulation 
precede industry government-
regulation? To what extent is the 
relationship between industry 
government-regulation and self-
regulation complementary or 
substitutive? How does each type of 
regulation respond to an economic 
crisis, and to what extent is one type 
of regulation more responsive to an 
economic crisis as compared to the 
other? 
1. Strength of government-
regulation 
2. Strength of self-regulation 
1. Strength of self-regulation 
2. Strength of government-
regulation 
3. Polcon 
4. Government stability 
5. Market concentration 
6. Government spending 
7. Year during or after crisis 
8. Year after crisis 
9. Year during crisis 
 
Essay 3: Regulations, Regulatory 
Authority, and Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Global Financial 
Services Sector 
To what extent are host country 
national-level regulations, industry-
level regulations, and industry self-
regulation effective at attracting 
foreign direct investment in the 
financial services sector? 
Inward FDI 
1. Strength of host country 
national-regulations 
2. Strength of host country 
industry (government) 
regulations 




CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 – ENTERING THE DEBATE: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL SECTOR 




 Technically, regulation is defined as “…action or behavior that is required by 
governments – it is not voluntary, and the regulators are public authorities” (Haufler, 2003: 230). 
However, the concept of regulation and regulators began to shift as the world became more 
economically integrated. Toward the end of the twentieth century, many countries (particularly 
industrialized nations) deregulated aspects of their economies as a byproduct of the shift towards 
greater globalization and economic liberalism (Helleiner, 1995; Isik & Hassan, 2003). 
Globalization also facilitated the growth of multinational enterprises (MNEs), mainly through 
foreign direct investment (FDI). However, as firms increased their presence across borders, they 
increasingly interacted with governments with widely disparate regulations. Additionally, 
globalization decreased the costs for communicating and coordinating across borders, which 
resulted in an increase in the depth and breadth of social activism, particularly targeted toward 
the business practices of MNEs (Haufler, 2001). However, most governments were not equipped 
to adequately engage adequately in international governance.  
While governments reduced their power and influence in the marketplace, in many 
countries, individual firms and other independent (non-governmental) organizations were 
encouraged to monitor and police practices, as well as establish standards within their respective 
industries1. In other words, the practice of self-regulation was increasingly encouraged in many 
industries. Industry self-regulation is defined as a “…regulatory process whereby an industry-
                                                
1	See the speech given by William Cary (1963), Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
 8 
level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level organization (such as a trade association or a 
professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the 
industry” (Gupta & Lad, 1983: 417). While self-regulation involves increased participation of 
industry actors in regulation, researchers (Gunningham & Rees, 1997; McCaffrey & Hart, 1998; 
Omarova, 2011) and practitioners (Cary, 1963) make it clear that it should not be interpreted as 
the complete absence of governmental regulation. However, there has been much debate across 
different industries and amongst researchers, policymakers, social activists, and practitioners 
regarding the level of authority that should be granted to organizations to regulate themselves. 
While researchers, practitioners, and policymakers tend to agree that there is a need for 
some business activities to be regulated (Guasch & Hahn, 1999; Warren, 2008), the question of 
which parties are best suited to effectively establish, monitor, and enforce these regulations has 
been, and remains up for debate. The ongoing debate regarding the effectiveness of regulations 
imposed by public actors versus those imposed by private actors and organizations is rather 
interdisciplinary. While various researchers have examined the phenomenon of industry self-
regulation as well as its comparison in terms of effectiveness to government-regulations for 
several decades, results from these studies do not allow us to draw highly conclusive insights 
regarding the subject matter for two main reasons. First, many of these studies examine the 
effectiveness of regulations (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Gupta & Lad, 1983; Vogel, 2010); 
however, there is a lack of consensus regarding what it means to be effective. Second, much of 
this research is based on case studies focused on one specific industry (usually chemical, energy, 
or healthcare) that typically examine one or a few firms. While these studies produce notable 
insights, it is difficult to generalize the effects of regulations on firms’ actions across various 
firms and industries (especially service industries). 
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In the international business (IB) discipline in particular, the contributions made by 
scholars to the government versus self-regulation debate have been rather sparse. Specifically, 
there is a lack of research in IB that empirically examines the effectiveness of government versus 
self-regulation simultaneously. Since the increase in self-regulation programs worldwide has 
been attributed in large part to globalization, internationalization scholars in particular may be 
able to contribute to this debate by examining how government-regulation and self-regulation are 
effective in encouraging firm internationalization and further globalization. Many studies 
examine the effects of host country government-regulations on firm internationalization (Allen, 
Chakraborty, & Watanabe, 2011; Globerman & Shapiro, 1999; Xing & Kolstad, 2002). Although 
the vast majority of self-regulation studies in IB are focused on the likelihood of firms to adopt 
voluntary internationalization standards certifications (e.g., Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Delmas 
& Montiel, 2008; Welch, Mori, & Aoyagi-Usui, 2002), there are very few that examine how self-
regulation programs affect firm internationalization (some examples are Clougherty & Grajek, 
2008 and Prakash & Potoski, 2007). 
As such, I fulfill four primary objectives in this dissertation. First, I review the history of 
cross-national financial sector regulation. Second, I review the extant literature on industry self-
regulation and the government-regulation versus self-regulation debate. Third, I nest the concept 
of self-regulation within the IB field by providing an example of how IB scholars can examine 
self-regulation in an international context. Fourth, I propose an agenda for future IB research on 
self-regulation in order to extend understanding of the concept amongst researchers in multiple 
disciplines, and to foster additional theory building within the management and IB fields.  
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THE STATE OF CROSS-NATIONAL FINANCIAL SECTOR REGULATION 
Although banks and other financial institutions have been engaged in cross-border 
transactions for a long time, regulation of these institutions was mainly at the domestic level, 
with very little international coordination, up until the last few decades. A notable exception is 
the creation of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), which was initially established in 
1930 to manage German reparations from World War I. Nevertheless, there were very few cross-
national initiatives to regulate the financial sector prior to the 1970s.  
The overall purpose of financial sector regulation is two-fold: (1) to establish prudential 
minimum standards at the individual firm level, and (2) to reduce systemic financial risk (Finel-
Honigman & Sotelino, 2015). Most countries have multiple government agencies that are tasked 
with providing oversight over specific aspects of the domestic financial sector with the idea that 
their combined regulatory efforts will contribute to a healthy and sound financial system. For 
example, many countries have a government-backed deposit insurance agency to guarantee the 
safety of customers’ bank deposits. These deposit insurance agencies consistently monitor the 
health of their insured institutions, and use the premiums paid by member-banks to guarantee 
customers’ deposits in the event of a bank failure. The United States was the first country to 
create formally a deposit insurance agency with the establishment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933 during the Great Depression. Other, mostly high income, 
countries slowly followed suit (e.g., the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation was created in 
1967); however, it was not until the 1990s when the world would start to see a significant 
increase in the number of national deposit insurance agencies across all economic income levels 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Karacaovali, & Laeven, 2005).  
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Most countries also have a central bank, which may vary in its level of independence 
from the government across nations. Central banks are typically responsible for establishing and 
coordinating monetary policy (i.e., money supply and interest rates), and providing supervision 
and regulation over the country’s banking system. Additionally, central banks serve as lender of 
last resort to financial institutions facing liquidity difficulties, especially in times of economic 
stress. Although the origins of central banking date back to at least the seventeenth century, most 
existing central banks were modeled after the Bank of England, which was founded in 1694, and 
started a wave of early central banks throughout Europe. The Federal Reserve Bank in the U.S. 
was established in 1913 during a later wave of central banks at the turn of the twentieth century 
(Bordo, 2007) that spread across North America, South America, and Oceana.  
Many nations have also utilized collaboration mechanisms across multiple government 
agencies in order to ensure the safety and soundness of their financial sectors. Examples of such 
interagency regulatory collaboration in the U.S. U.K., Canada, and the European Union are 
provided in Table 2.1. The financial regulatory landscape throughout the European Union is 
particularly interesting, as it is comprised of actors and agencies at multiple levels. While each 
EU member nation has its own national regulatory authorities, with direct supervision over 
financial sector activities within their jurisdictions, there are supranational organizations that 
engage with the greater international community outside of the EU and issue regulatory 
directives within the EU.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2.1 here 
------------------------------ 
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Globalization and extensive integration of financial markets dictated the necessity for 
international regulatory coordination. Extensive cross-national heterogeneity in financial sector 
regulation gives rise to regulatory arbitrage, and firms engaging in risky behaviors (Herdegen, 
2013). Given the financial sector’s susceptibility to contagion, regulators around the world, 
particularly in the economically advanced countries, recognized the need for international 
financial sector governance. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was formed to 
promote international standards for the capitalization, as well as the supervision and regulation of 
international banks. Although the Basel Committee was actually formed in 1974, it issued its 
first directive (Basel I Accord) in 1988 in response to the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s 
It initially started as a committee of central bank governors from the G-10 countries plus 
Luxembourg and Switzerland, but in 2009, membership expanded to include larger emerging 
markets such as China, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Although the 
G-10 countries initially approved the Basel I Accord, over 120 countries eventually adopted it. 
While the Basel Committee sets guidelines to achieve better international harmonization of 
financial regulations, it has no formal authority to enforce the guidelines that are promulgated in 
their accords. It is the responsibility of the domestic regulatory authorities to implement the 
agreed-upon guidelines within their own jurisdictions. 
Since 1988, the Basel Committee has improved international regulation coordination by 
revising and issuing new guidelines. Two major Accords have been issued since the Committee’s 
initial founding, which are largely in response to major international crises. The Basel II Accord 
was promoted in response to the Southern Asian and Russian financial crises of 1997 and 1998. 
The Accord introduced the three regulatory pillars of minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
review, and market discipline. The EU and most countries with a large and significant banking 
 13 
sector have implemented Basel II. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 illuminated the 
structural defects in the architecture of Basel II, such as poor supervision and regulation over 
firms’ internal risk measurement and management procedures. Thus, the Committee agreed on 
the Basel III Accord in 2011, which severely tightened the Basel II guidelines, imposed new 
financial standards for all banks, and established additional capital requirements for systemically 
important financial institutions (the so-called “too big to fail” institutions). 
Although there has been an increase in the international coordination efforts of various 
governments and government agencies, the global governance of financial institutions remains 
significantly informal (Herdegen, 2013). Global governance is informal in the sense that 
intergovernmental and supranational regulatory institutions, such as the Basel Committee and the 
Financial Stability Forum2, serve as international committees for national-level representatives to 
collaborate and agree upon acceptable international standards and frameworks for financial 
sector supervision and regulation (Eichengreen, 2003). The committees themselves; however, 
have neither authority that supersedes the regulatory authority of their member countries, nor are 
their agreed-upon directives that are legally binding. Global financial sector governance is also 
informal in the sense that it is not the exclusive domain of governmental bodies. 
Nongovernmental organizations and other private industry associations play an active role in 
coordinating international industry codes and standards. Eichengreen (2003) suggests that 
international financial markets are more regulated by private actors than governments. However, 
there is much debate regarding the proper mix of public and private governance in the global 
financial sector. 






THE SELF-REGULATION AND GOVERNMENT-REGULATION OF 
INDUSTRY DEBATE: AN OVERVIEW 
 Although the government- versus self-regulation debate is seemingly fragmented, as it 
spans multiple disciplines, I review some of the key aspects of the debate in this section. Table 
2.2 provides an organized summary of some of the recurring arguments present in this debate, 
which can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) setting standards and rules, (2) 
enforcement, and (3) outcomes and effectiveness.  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2.2 here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Setting standards and rules.  
Regulations, of all types, are essentially comprised of various standards and rules. The 
scholars in support of allowing private actors to develop regulations typically support their 
stance in the debate with knowledge- and capacity-based arguments. These scholars tend to 
follow the logic of Durkheim (2013), who states, “Activity within a profession can only be 
effectively regulated through a group close enough to that profession to be thoroughly cognisant 
of how it functions, capable of perceiving all its needs and following every fluctuation in them. 
The sole group that meets these conditions is that constituted by all those working in the same 
industry…” (p. 11).  The idea is that employees, and other private actors within the industry, are 
most effective at establishing the regulations for the industry because they have more firm-
specific and industry-specific knowledge due to their proximity to the industry and the tasks 
involved in the work being done (Anantharaman, 2012). Furthermore, compared to government 
actors, individuals within the industry are more likely to generate buy-in from those being 
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regulated, as their proposed standards are more likely to be perceived as more equitable and 
appropriate (Gupta & Lad, 1983). In order for any regulatory efforts to be successful, Lenox and 
Nash (2003) assert that it is essential for governing bodies to engender acceptance and support 
from those being regulated.  
 The opposite side of this debate, which supports giving rule- and standard-setting 
authority to public actors, largely questions the ability and motivations of firms to create 
regulations for themselves. There is a large concern that firms are not necessarily more willing 
than the government to regulate effectively, especially if they cannot make the business case for 
doing so (Braithwaite, 1982). Thus, although firms may be more capable of setting appropriate 
standards due to their knowledge of the industry, it is questionable whether they will actually do 
so, especially if they do not see any monetary value in doing so. 
Enforcement 
 Once regulations are established, the next reasonable step is to establish enforcement 
authority. The logic used by scholars that support enforcement by industry actors is similar to 
that used in support of allowing industry actors to develop the regulations. The proximity that 
individuals within the industry must do the actual job functions and tasks allows them to keep a 
closer eye on activities, catch violations more readily, and quickly enforce the appropriate 
penalties (Hilary & Lennox, 2005). Braithwaite (1982) explains that the power of corporate 
inspectors, such as internal and external corporate compliance groups, to trap suspected 
wrongdoers is often greater than that possessed by government investigators because they have 
an information advantage, as they are insiders to what is going on within the industry.  
 However, there is a large amount of support for allocating enforcement authority to 
government actors, even if industry insiders develop the regulations (Braithwaite, 1982; King & 
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Lenox, 2000). Private actors cannot be completely relied upon to enforce sanctions fairly and 
effectively, particularly due to their profit-seeking motivations (Cary, 1963). Thus, King and 
Lennox (2000) and Braithwaite (1982) maintain that this authority should be designated for the 
government. There is also a concern that in practice, private actors have limited power to 
actually penalize malfeasance in the way that the government can (King & Lenox, 2000; Stigler, 
1971). Moreover, Gunningham and Rees (1997) suggest that when industry self-regulation is in 
place, standards are usually weak, enforcement is ineffective, and punishment is secret and mild, 
which creates regulatory programs that are largely futile.  
Outcomes and effectiveness.  
Research questions relating to the outcomes and effectiveness of industry self-regulation 
are the most difficult to answer, and are the source of most of the debates within this literature 
(Gupta & Lad, 1983). Empirical research on the accounting profession shows that regulation 
under the authority of industry insiders is effective. Prior to the implementation of the U.S. 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)3, peer reviews and assessments provided much better 
information about accounting firms than the inspectors that now make up the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)4 (DeFond, 2010; Lennox & Pittman, 2010).  
 Additionally, there are several arguments suggesting industry self-regulation does a better 
job of fostering competition than industry regulation by the government. According to Garvin 
(1983), less government-regulation increases competition, as was seen in the airlines and 
                                                
3 SOX is comprised of many reforms intended to strengthen corporate responsibility and 
financial disclosures, while attenuating corporate and accounting fraud (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2013). 
 
4 The U.S. Congress, via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to oversee the audits of public companies, 
established the PCAOB, which took over regulation/monitoring tasks from the American 
Institute of CPAs (AICPA) (PCAOB, 2016).	
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communications sectors. Product and managerial standards that are typically implemented by 
industry participants tend to facilitate price comparisons and price competition, increase the 
availability and accuracy of product information for buyers, and produce cost savings and 
production efficiencies because of economies of scale (Wotruba, 1997). Some studies focused on 
environmental regulations show that if self-regulation standards are higher than those imposed 
by the government, then firms may be induced to develop superior management capabilities and 
technologies, which may give them a strategic advantage (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). MNEs 
in particular can adopt voluntary certifiable standards as a mechanism to increase their 
competitive position in the global economy (Christmann & Taylor, 2001). 
 Arguments that support the notion that regulation by government actors is more effective 
suggest that the government is able to produce more socially desirable results. According to 
Gunningham and Rees (1997), industry self-regulation tends to fail to fulfill its theoretical 
promise, more commonly serving the industry rather than the public interest. There is little 
empirical evidence that industry self-regulation has positively contributed to society by limiting 
harmful practices of member firms (Barnett & King, 2008). However, Garvin (1983) argues that 
industry self-regulation is capable of producing socially desirable results when the following 
factors are present: countervailing power, limited market power, substantial cost savings are 
possible, and positive benefits are obtainable by all industry participants. Yet, advocates for 
government-regulation of industry assert that even though it may appear that self-regulatory 
programs may be in place in order to benefit society, they are usually established in a preemptive 
manner in order to prevent more stringent government-regulation and serve their profit-driven 
interests (McCaffrey & Hart, 1998; Prakash, & Potoski, 2007; Wotruba, 1997). 
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 In terms of fostering competition, regulations imposed by the government tend to level 
the playing field so that all firms in the industry can compete fairly (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). 
There is substantial concern that self-regulation may inhibit competition in the industry 
(Wotruba, 1997) if regulations are implemented to specifically benefit certain firms at the 
expense of others. Garvin (1983) acknowledges that industry self-regulation can lead to less 
competition if it places constraints on entry into the industry and if it requires substantial product 
and/or price uniformity. There is also the argument that there is a major conflict of interest issue 
when firms regulate their competitors, as they may regulate competitors more aggressively as a 
form of a non-market strategy (Garvin, 1983). For example, in the public accounting industry, 
Anantharaman (2012) shows that reviewers in the same industry or geographic area identify 
more deficiencies due to a more in-depth understanding of the firm and because they are in direct 
competition with the reviewed firm for a similar pool of clients. 
Common ground  
A key contribution to this ongoing regulatory debate may be that industry self-regulation 
and government-regulation are often viewed as dichotomous, seemingly forcing researchers and 
policymakers to favor one over the other. However, Bartle and Vass (2007) suggest that this 
dichotomy is actually false. While on its surface, self-regulation is viewed as having little or no 
role for the state, in reality; self-regulatory schemes are almost always attached to the state to 
some degree. This is even apparent when one considers the revolving doors that often exist 
between industry and government. The revolving door phenomenon illuminates that individuals 
who work in industry may eventually obtain positions as government regulators (and vice-versa) 
(Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992), which Gormley (1979) shows has an affect on how industry is 
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regulation. Therefore, there is likely an endogenous relationship between government-
regulations and industry participants. 
Black (2001) also asserts that researchers should do away with the idea of a dichotomous 
relationship between self-regulation and government-regulation. Doing so would allow for more 
robust analysis of governance and regulation, since many hybrid forms of regulation and 
regulatory organizations exist. Since self-regulation involves varying degrees of government 
involvement, Bartle and Vass (2007) suggest that the most appropriate way to conceptualize self-
regulation is in terms of its relationship with the government and government-regulation. 
Similarly, Ogus (2000) offers a way to conceptualize regulatory arrangements along two spectra 
with one indicating the degree to which private or public entities approve the rules, and the other 
indicating the varying degrees of legal force.   
While there are many arguments in the self-regulation literature that are strongly in favor 
or against it, there have been some attempts to combine the perspectives from the two extremes 
in order to find some common ground. There is a general level of consensus that an ideal 
industry regulatory effort would incorporate a mix of government and self-regulation, as self-
regulation may supplement or complement direct regulation by the government (Gunningham & 
Rees, 1997; Gupta & Lad, 1983; Sinclair, 1997). In some contexts, industry self-regulation may 
fill a void left by governmental failure to protect and enhance the welfare of society and enforce 
regulations (Christmann & Taylor, 2001). However, debate regarding the proper mix of both 
types of regulation persists (Wotruba, 1997). Some researchers suggest that practitioners are 
better suited for regulating day-to-day activities; whereas, government and other external 
agencies are better for regulating more broad activities and policies (Cary, 1963; Gunningham & 
Rees, 1997). In order to subdue the concerns regarding enforcement under a self-regulatory 
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program, Braithwaite (1982) proposes a model of enforced self-regulation that combines self-
regulation by industry actors and enforcement by government agencies. Cary (1963), and 
Omarova (2011) also attest that government presence is needed to ensure that action in the name 
of self-regulation is neither discriminatory nor erratic. Lenox & Nash (2003) suggest that the 
government can provide incentives for firms to adopt strict governance structures by rewarding 
those that participate in effective self-regulation programs.  
INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES IN SELF-
REGULATION RESEARCH 
With the exception of including voluntary international standards adoption into the self-
regulation discussion, there is a dearth of contributions from international business scholars. As 
business activity becomes increasingly globalized, examining cross-national differences in 
regulations and regulatory authority, in addition to their influences on firm strategies has also 
become more pertinent. International business scholars in particular have provided significant 
contributions advancing the literature on institutions and institutional theory. As such, it is 
appropriate to combine core insights from the international business field into the self-regulation 
versus government-regulation of industry dispute in order to examine how this debate manifests 
in the context of MNEs. Accordingly, the following section draws upon the literature on 
institutions and internationalization in order to offer an example of how IB scholars may 
examine self-regulation by proposing how regulatory authority matters in attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in the financial services sector. 
Industry self-regulation and inward FDI in the global financial services sector 
Having an excess of self-regulation in the financial services sector received a substantial 
amount of blame for the severity of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Helleiner & 
 21 
Pagliari, 2010; Omarova, 2011). As a result of the financial crisis, financial sector reforms (e.g., 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed in 2010 in the U.S.) were 
largely focused on shifting regulatory authority out of the hands of private actors and into the 
hands of government agencies (in many cases, one particular agency) (Boyer & Ponce, 2012; 
Pagliari, 2012). In addition, many practices that were once voluntarily implemented as a form of 
self-regulation (e.g., hedge fund managers disclosing the identity of their funds) were made 
mandatory and backed by the coercive power and authority of the state (Pagliari, 2012).  
 Although there are valid arguments in the institutions and FDI literature in support of a 
positive relationship between high quality host country financial sector regulations imposed by 
the government and inward FDI, it is also possible for industry self-regulation to influence 
significantly inward FDI in the financial services sector. Private industry actors may have a 
greater capacity to develop and enforce rules that target specific activities of financial sector 
firms and are more appropriate for the sector (Cary, 1963; Gunningham & Rees, 1997) due to 
their industry-specific knowledge. International industry associations, such as the Global 
Association of Risk Professionals (GARP), may also be more equipped with the knowledge and 
resources necessary to design and implement industry standards that are most appropriate for 
firms that operate on an international scale. For various reasons, it is very difficult for 
government regulators to attract and maintain staff that are highly skilled and capable of 
understanding complex financial instruments and transactions to regulate and monitor financial 
services firms effectively and efficiently (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2008). Given the strengths of 
industry self-regulation programs, they have the ability to supplement the state’s regulation of 
the industry or even fill a void left by the state (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; King, Lenox, & 
Terlaak, 2005), which may be particularly salient in developing countries (Delmas, 2009).  
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 There is a camp of scholars within the collective action literature with a skeptical view 
concerning industry self-regulation that suggests self-regulation programs may be established to 
avoid a common threat (e.g., foreign market entrant or onerous government-regulation) or to 
enhance the collective performance of the domestic industry (Garvin, 1983; King & Lennox, 
2000). This would suggest a negative effect on inward FDI. However, insights from other 
collective action scholars suggest that managers may engage in collective action through 
voluntary self-regulation programs in order to benefit the entire industry, not just a particular 
subset (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1987). In this case, industry-self regulation may attract inward FDI. 
 By bringing the government versus self-regulation of industry debate into the institutions 
and FDI literature, researchers may examine how authority over host country institutions matters 
in attracting or deterring FDI. Further research by IB scholars on this topic may contribute to the 
literature on institutions and internationalization by specifically highlighting industry-level 
institutions and disentangling how authority over these institutions matters. While researchers 
have lamented the lack of knowledge and inconsistent findings regarding which types of 
institutions matter in attracting or deterring FDI (Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2011), the 
effect of institutions and authority over the institutions outside of a macro-level analysis has been 
largely underexplored. IB research on institutions predominantly focuses on the quality of 
institutions at a more macro level, and under the authority of the state or state actors. However, 
scholars can offer a more robust institutional analysis of FDI by examining the role of industry 
self-regulation in firm internationalization.  
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PROPOSED AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Significance of contextual factors 
 The quality of industry self-regulation may matter more in certain macro-institutional 
contexts. Specifically, future research may want to examine the interaction between the qualities 
of industry-level institutions and macro-level institutions because institutions do not operate in 
isolation (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2003; King & Toffel, 2009). Delmas (2009), for 
example, questions the significance and effectiveness of industry self-regulation programs in the 
context of countries with poor regulatory environments at the macro-level. Likewise, Garvin 
(1983), Gunningham and Rees (1997), and Short and Toffel (2010) attest that good macro-level 
regulations and enforcement mechanisms are still needed in order for self-regulation to be 
effective and produce socially desirable results. Therefore, other researchers may want to 
contribute to the call for more research examining the interaction of institutions (Zhou & Peng, 
2010) by investigating how the effect that one institution has on FDI is moderated by the quality 
of the greater institutional environment in which it is embedded. 
  Although the government- versus self-regulation debate is typically focused on the 
advantages and disadvantages of placing regulatory authority under the purview of public 
agencies versus private organizations, it is possible to question whether regulatory authority 
really matters in the grand scheme of things. One of the major concerns in the government versus 
self-regulation debate regards which regulators are better at protecting the consumers and the 
general public from potential harm that may be caused by firms (Garvin, 1983; King & Lenox, 
2000). However, firms over time eventually adapt to enacted regulations and standards over time 
due to isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Salomon & Wu, 2012) irrespective of 
regulatory authority, and if they want to find loopholes around regulations and standards that 
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may potentially jeopardize the welfare of the industry and other stakeholders, they usually will 
(Braithwaite, 1982). Thus, a more appropriate focus for this debate may extend beyond which 
actors should have regulatory authority, to: in which contexts is regulatory authority a valid 
concern?  
Precisely examine effectiveness 
Extant research does not provide a clear picture of what an effective self-regulatory 
program looks like. The effectiveness of self-regulation varies across industries due to its social 
and economic context and to the self-regulatory program’s institutional design (Gunningham & 
Rees, 1997). The example of industry self-regulation and inward FDI in the global financial 
services sector provides a specific context in which to examine the effectiveness of self-
regulation. By narrowing the definition of effectiveness in each study, researchers can more 
clearly show whether industry self-regulation is an effective, ineffective, or a non-contributing 
factor in international business activities.  
One of the most pressing concerns about regulations for academics, practitioners, and 
policymakers is the optimal mix of government- and self-regulation. Scholars can make some 
considerable headway on this topic by pursuing research that more precisely examines the 
effectives of different types of regulations. By specifically focusing on inward FDI in the 
financial services sector, for example, researchers may be able to derive a model for determining 
the optimal mix of regulatory authority within this context and then examine the extent to which 
such a model is generalizable across different industries. Another way to assess the effectiveness 
of regulations is to examine regulatory response to an exogenous shock, such as a major 
economic crisis. Since financial sector regulations are created under the overall purpose of 
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creating and maintaining a healthy financial system and preventing systemic crises, an economic 
crisis would be an appropriate test for examining the effectiveness of regulations. 
Increasing empirical research 
Finally, researchers are encouraged to conduct more quantitative empirical studies 
examining industry self-regulation in an international context. One such study may examine the 
influence of regulations under the authority of the state at the macro- and industry-level in 
comparison to industry self-regulation. A study of this nature may be able to provide insights 
into which types of institutions matter and how the authority of those different types of 
institutions matters within the context of FDI. International Business and strategic management 
researchers can make considerable contributions by examining the performance implications of 
industry self-regulation by investigating the extent to which there is a link between firms’ 
influence over regulatory changes and firm performance. Some of the extant research has already 
suggested that some firms may use self-regulation as a non-market strategy within its industry; 
therefore, this leaves plenty of opportunity for researchers to examine empirically the 
effectiveness of such strategies by examining firms’ performance outcomes once changes in 
regulations and standards have occurred.  
CONCLUSION 
The cross-border activities of financial services firms have increased significantly over 
the past few decades, particularly because of globalization and economic integration. The 
internationalization of financial markets has led to a greater need for global governance, forcing 
regulation of the financial sector to evolve (Eichengreen, 2003). Although governmental 
agencies from various countries have created institutions to facilitate more international 
collaboration on industry standards and best practices for supervision and regulation, self-
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regulation continues to play a significant role in the governance of the global financial services 
sector. However, there is a lack of research, particularly in the International Business field, that 
examines how and why firms engage in regulatory practices of their industries and how effective 
these efforts are. As such, I encourage researchers to consider some of the research streams 
proposed in this study in order to advance our understanding of how financial services firms 
around the world participate in the global governance of industry, and how effective they are at 
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Table 2.2 Overview of the Government Versus Self-Regulation of Industry Debate 
 
Category  Arguments supporting self-regulation Arguments supporting government-regulation 
Setting standards and rules  Private actors within the industry have more specific 
knowledge and the capacity to set appropriate 
standards  
(Anantharaman, 2012; Durkheim, 2013) 
 
Industry personnel are better able to get buy-in from 
those being regulated  
(Gupta & Lad, 1983) 
Firms may not be as motivated as the government to 
regulate themselves rigorously (Braithwaite, 1982) 
Enforcement  Proximity and access to inside information allow 
industry actors to quickly enforce regulations and 
reprimand any wrongdoing  
(Braithwaite, 1982; Hilary & Lennox, 2005)  
Firms’ profit-seeking motivations do not allow them 
to fairly and effectively enforce regulations (Cary, 
1963) 
 
Private actors have limited power to actually penalize 
wrongdoing in the same manner as the government  
(King & Lenox, 2000) 
Outcomes and effectiveness  Due to their industry-specific knowledge, industry 
actors are better at conducting accurate and effective 
assessments of their peers  
(DeFond, 2010; Lennox & Pittman, 2010) 
 
Self-regulation is better at fostering industry 
competition than the government  
(Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Garvin, 1983; Porter & 
Linde, 1995; Wotruba, 1997) 
Regulation by the government is able to produce 
more socially desirable results than self-regulation  
(Barnett & King, 2008; Gunningham & Rees, 1997) 
 
Private actors typically establish regulations for 
preemptive purposes and to serve their profit-driven 
interests without much consideration for societal 
outcomes  
(King & Toffel, 2009; Prakash & Potoski, 2007) 
 
Government-regulations tend to allow firms in an 
industry to compete fairly by leveling the playing 
field  
(Rajan & Zingales, 2003) 
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 – THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL SECTOR 
GOVERNMENT-REGULATION AND SELF-REGULATION AND THEIR RESPONSE 




 Although regulation is commonly conceptualized as being under the purview of 
government actors and agencies, private organizations (e.g., firms, industry associations, 
nongovernmental organizations, etc.) are increasingly becoming involved in regulation and 
oversight of business activities, particularly at the industry level (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). 
Broadly speaking, self-regulation refers to rules or standards that are not set or enforced by the 
government (Prado, 2013). More specifically, Gupta and Lad (1983) define self-regulation as a 
“…regulatory process whereby an industry-level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level 
organization…sets and enforces rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms in the 
industry” (p. 417). The emergence of self-regulation on an international scale is largely attributed 
to globalization and an increase in business activities conducted by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). The rise in business transactions conducted across borders has created a need for global 
coordination and regulation, and subsequently, governing institutions with global reach (King, 
Prado, & Rivera, 2012).  
Public and private organizations have assumed roles in regulating business activities 
domestically and internationally, which have resulted in the formation of a complex global 
regulatory environment (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Vogel, 2010). Scholars across various 
disciplines have attempted to increase our understanding of this complex regulatory environment 
by conducting research that explores: (1) conditions under which self-regulation is likely to 
emerge (King & Toffel, 2009), (2) the likelihood of firms to voluntarily subscribe to self-
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regulation (King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005; Welch, Mori, & Aoyagi-Usui, 2002); (3) the 
effectiveness of government-regulation and self-regulation (Barnett & King, 2008; Doshi, 
Dowell, & Toffel, 2013; Hart, 2009; O’Rourke, 2003), and regulatory models that incorporate 
varying levels of government-regulation and self-regulation (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002; Wotruba, 
1997). Much of the existing research is either conceptual or based on case studies and historical 
anecdotes. While there are some quantitative empirical studies in this area of research, much of it 
is geared toward analyzing the antecedents and consequences of voluntary standards adoption 
(Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Christmann & Taylor, 2006). Nevertheless, there are still many 
unanswered questions about the relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation, 
as well as the effectiveness of each type of regulation.  
   There is a widely held belief that given firms’ industry-specific expertise, they tend to 
take the lead on setting industry standards ahead of involvement from the government (Cantwell, 
Dunning, & Lundan, 2009; Haufler, 2003; Vogel, 2010). While claims that self-regulation tends 
to precede government-regulation are typically supported by historical evidence and case studies, 
there is a lack of widespread, quantitative evidence to support this claim. Another unclear aspect 
about the nature of the relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation is how 
they work together in the overall regulatory scheme. While many scholars agree that regulatory 
frameworks should include elements of government-regulation and self-regulation (and there is 
clear evidence around the world that both types of regulations exist simultaneously) there is not a 
clear consensus of whether government-regulation and self-regulation are complementary or 
substitutive. Prado (2013), for example, notes that self-regulation can be an alternative or 
complement to government-regulation. However, case study research conducted by Vogel (2010) 
suggests that self-regulation cannot substitute for government-regulation, and the regulatory 
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environment is most effective when both types of regulations are combined in a complementary 
way. Additionally, there is extensive debate regarding the effectiveness of government-
regulation and self-regulation; however, these debates have not drawn us closer to reaching a 
consensus on effectiveness. Part of the reason for this lack of coverage may reside in the fact that 
there are few quantitative empirical tests of regulatory effectiveness. One way to assess the 
effectiveness of a type of regulation is to examine its response and behavior during a major 
exogenous shock, such as an economic crisis.  
Given the level of understanding that remains regarding the involvement of public and 
private organization in the overall regulatory environment, the purpose of this research is to 
conduct an exploratory study of the relationship between government-regulation and self-
regulation, and their responses during times of crisis. Using the context of the global financial 
services industry and the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, I specifically explore the following 
research questions: (1) to what extent does self-regulation precede industry government-
regulation? (2) To what extent is the relationship between industry government-regulation and 
self-regulation complementary or substitutive? (3) How does each type of regulation respond to 
an economic crisis, and to what extent is one type of regulation more responsive to an economic 
crisis as compared to the other? 
In the following section, I draw upon previous research to support hypotheses on the 
nature of the relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation, and their responses 
during an economic crisis. Next, I provide a description of the data, measures, and methodology 
used to test my hypotheses. Finally, the study concludes with a discussion of the empirical 
findings, contributions, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Haufler (2003) suggests that standards and regulatory mechanisms developed by private 
industry experts may form the building blocks or set the precedence for future domestic and 
international regulatory regimes. Haufler (2003) further explains that the private sector has 
always been the primary source for some sorts of governance (particularly standards-setting) 
ahead of, or in addition to, any directives from government agencies. This outcome is largely due 
to the first-hand knowledge that industry insiders have over the daily operations and innovations 
in the industry.  
In a global business environment, private actors (e.g., MNEs, international industry 
associations, NGOs, etc.) have had to take the lead on industry regulation in order to conduct 
business across borders and ensure that standards are met. Intergovernmental regulation, at the 
international level, is not extensive; however, since MNEs operate in a global environment, they 
tend to take the initiative proactively to voluntarily agree upon international standards in order to 
conduct business successfully. The emergence and rise of industry self-regulation is due, in part, 
to threats from increased government-regulation, and to increased transnational activism 
regarding social issues (to which governments were not responding quickly) (Haufler, 2003). 
While one may predict that increased globalization would shift governance upward to 
supranational and intergovernmental levels, Eichengreen (2003) suggests that this neither is the 
only response, nor is it the likely one. Supranational and intergovernmental organizations 
typically reflect diverse views and find it difficult to agree on specific recommendations. 
Oftentimes, this leads to delays in regulatory actions, essentially forcing private industry 
participants to take matters into their own hands, as exchanges and communications would be 
very difficult without agreed upon standards (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). The highly 
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global nature of some industries, such as the financial sector, makes it very difficult for 
government regulators to regulate them effectively on a domestic and international level. This 
difficulty provides a strong case for international cooperation amongst private industry actors 
(Eichengreen, 2003). 
According to Haufler’s (2003) conceptualization of self-regulation, government agencies 
are not the main authors of the rules and are not the lead actors in developing and implementing 
regulatory systems. One of the key mechanisms for institutional change is when industry actors 
standardize new technologies and innovations (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2009). In general, 
innovations within an industry occur more quickly than government actors are able to keep up, 
and this is especially pertinent in the financial sector (Herring, 2004). Financial innovation 
occurs so rapidly that, according to Eichengreen (2003), “…regulators will always be one step 
behind…” (p. 195). When comparing government discipline to market discipline (self-
regulation), Herring (2004) notes that discipline from government actors tends to be “rule-based, 
episodic, bureaucratic and slow to change;” yet, market discipline is “forward-looking and 
inherently flexible and adaptive…continuous, impersonal and non-bureaucratic” (p. 365). Thus, 
it is generally presumed that self-regulation is more flexible, and tends to precede government-
regulation (Sinclair, 1997); however, there is not sufficient and widespread empirical evidence to 
support this anecdotal claim. 
 There are additional anecdotal claims and case studies that indicate self-regulation tends 
to precede domestic government and intergovernmental regulation on a global scale (Cantwell, 
Dunning, & Lundan, 2009; O’Rourke, 2003; Vogel, 2010). An in-depth case study conducted by 
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) shows that global regulatory norms follow globalizing self-
regulatory practice. MNEs, international industry associations, and NGOs have largely taken the 
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lead on industry regulation by voluntarily agreeing upon international standards in order to 
conduct business within the MNE network and other firms across borders, and ensure that 
operational and product standards are met (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2009; Teegan, Doh, & 
Vachani, 2004).  
 Given the previous research that suggests the private sector tends to take the lead on 
standards-setting, government agencies are limited in their ability to keep up with industry 
innovations, and increased globalization makes it difficult for governments to regulate MNEs on 
domestic and international levels, I posit that changes in industry self-regulation tend to precede 
changes in government-regulation.  
Hypothesis 1: Changes in industry self-regulation generally precede changes in 
government-regulation. 
While there is a difference between industry self-regulation and government-regulation, 
and they do, at times, operate independently of each other, there may be a complementary 
relationship between the two types of regulation. In other words, when self-regulation and 
government-regulation work together, they may actually enhance each other provide a better 
overall regulatory framework than each can provide on its own. In general, government 
regulators and firms have a stake in the overall health of the financial sector. Like government 
actors, financial sector firms have concerns about systemic risk, and typically worry about it 
more than other serious business concerns, such as loss of reputation. Along this line of thinking, 
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) note that public and private actors within an industry are 
communities of shared fate against meltdown, and acknowledge that the long-run fate of the 
industry is the responsibility of all participants within it. Following Ostrom’s (1990) work on 
governing physical commons, Barnett & King (2008) also suggest that self-regulation forms out 
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of firms’ need to protect the shared industry commons that can be negatively affected when the 
action of one firm causes harmful spillovers to other firms within the industry. Firms recognize 
that operating within a solidly regulated industry provides a competitive advantage in the form of 
increased perception of confidence in the health and future value of the firm (Braithwaite & 
Drahos, 2000; McCaffrey & Hart, 1998). Additionally, when necessary, firms lobby or use their 
political connections to influence favorable government-regulations that affect their business 
activities (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Haufler, 2001; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). As such, 
although public and private actors may have different approaches to regulation, it is possible for 
the relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation to be complementary given 
the concerted interest in having quality oversight and standards in the financial sector (Mattli, 
2003).  
Several scholars suggest that the optimal regulatory environment is one in which industry 
regulation and self-regulation co-exist and support each other, rather than having an environment 
that is heavily weighted on either side of the spectrum (Bartle & Vass, 2007; Boddewyn, 1988; 
Braithwaite, 1982; Hart, 2009; O’Rourke, 2003; Sinclair, 1997; Vogel, 2010; Wotruba, 1997). 
Government-regulation and self-regulation each have their own limitations; thus, they may be 
complements in the sense that the regulatory environment is more effective when the two types 
of regulations are working together and alongside each other. Industry self-regulation, for 
example, is not likely to completely relieve the government of its regulatory burden and pressure 
to intervene within the industry because self-regulation enforcement can be very weak at times 
(Haufler, 2001; King & Lenox, 2000; Vogel, 2010) and can potentially be used for 
anticompetitive pressures (Gunningham & Rees, 1997). Haufler (2001) notes that self-regulation 
can compete with or supplement domestic regulatory norms, even when applied to industry 
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activities abroad; however, it is possible that while there may be heterogeneity in how firm’s 
individually engage in and adhere to self-regulation, at the industry level, self-regulation and 
government-regulation may work better toward the same goal.  
Government actors tend to support incorporating self-regulation within the regulatory 
framework because they can leverage the industry-specific expertise of private actors (Pagliari, 
2012), and subsequently engage in regulation that is more efficient (Haufler, 2001; Pierce & 
Toffel, 2013). Historically, government regulators have suffered with a lack of competence 
regarding the day-to-day operations and innovations occurring within an industry, such that 
much of their regulatory actions tend to be reactive rather than proactive. For example, as central 
banks started to develop during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the government devoted 
many resources to, first, learning about the basic operations of banking systems. However, the 
emergence of central banks was typically reactionary, resulting from financial crises (Braithwaite 
& Drahos, 2000). Given the limited capacity and resources provided to government agencies, 
government actors typically prefer to turn over the minutiae of regulation to industry actors in 
order to use their knowledge of industry operations and innovations to provide oversight that is 
more effective (Eichengreen, 2003).  
In many industries, we are seeing a paradigm shift from a model of direct government-
regulation to a model of government oversight of self-regulation (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000), 
or meta-regulation (Gupta & Lad, 1983), in which government regulators recognize the value of 
incorporating self-regulation. Such self-regulation can align with the overall objectives of 
maintaining the health and stability of a particular industry and the economy as a whole. For 
example, since the United Nations and a group of the world’s largest institutional investors 
collaborated to develop the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) in 2006, the number of 
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signatories has grown from 100 to over 1,100 financial institutions that now manage over $70 
trillion of assets around the world. Once a firm becomes a PRI signatory, it is required to 
publicly report on its responsible investment activities, to provide evidence that it incorporates 
environmental, social, and governance factors into investment decisions. Responsible investment 
activities are very important to government actors seeking, who want to ensure an economically 
efficient and sustainable global financial system (Principles for Responsible Investment 
Association, 2018).  
In sum, public and private actors have a shared interest in the vitality and sustainability of 
industry performance, the individual limitations of industry government and self-regulation may 
be overcome when they work together, and preliminary evidence suggests more governments are 
moving toward models of blended regulation. Therefore, it is possible that the relationship 
between industry government-regulation and self-regulation is complementary.    
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between industry government-regulation and self-
regulation is complementary. 
It is important to note that managers and government officials have innately different 
objectives and motivations that may manifest into divergent approaches to regulation (Pierce & 
Toffel, 2013). Managers have the primary task of generating value for the firm’s owners by 
focusing on profits (Abbot & Snidal, 2009). However, government is tasked with ensuring the 
health of the economy and the general welfare of the people within the country. While private 
industry actors may advocate for self-regulatory activities within the industry that appear to 
benefit the greater good, in many cases, managers may encourage such actions along with 
increased intervention from the government “…as a way to promote their economic advantage 
by limiting competition and innovation and by protecting markets” (Haufler, 2001: 107). 
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Focusing on firms’ voluntary adoption of certified standards, Christmann and Taylor (2006) find 
that firms implement these standards on a scale of symbolically (do not abide by the standards) 
to substantively (consistently abide by the standards), based on the firms’ perceived costs and 
benefits of doing so.  
Additionally, one of the prominent motivations for self-regulation initiatives is to 
preempt additional regulation from the government or intergovernmental organizations (Barnett 
& King, 2008; Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2009; Garvin, 1983; Wotruba, 1997). A study 
conducted by Short and Toffel (2008) shows that firms voluntarily self-reported violations and 
committed to self-policing after regulators invested a disproportionate amount of enforcement 
resources to inspect and prosecute them. If firms would rather have more self-regulation and less 
direct regulation from the government, and firms employ self-regulation such that this actually 
happens, one can posit a substitutive relationship between government-regulation and self-
regulation. In a study focused on firms’ compliance with environmental standards, Toffel and 
Short (2011) find that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulators use self-reporting 
as a heuristic for targeting enforcement resources, such that regulators allocate more regulatory 
resources toward firms that do not voluntarily self-report than they do toward firms that do self-
report. By using self-regulation as a substitute for its regulatory efforts, the government is able to 
ensure that the necessary amount of supervision and regulation is taking place (ideally), but at a 
lower cost to tax payers. Voluntary regulatory initiatives lower the government’s costs of 
supervision and regulation, and challenges governments to develop new institutional incentives 
for the private sector to continue to expand these voluntary regulatory activities (Haufler, 2001).  
Another motivation for self-regulation is to fill institutional voids left by weak 
governments, or governments in transition (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; King, Lenox, & 
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Terlaak, 2005; Meyer, 2004; Scherer & Smid, 2000). Where government-regulation is weak, we 
may see self-regulation strengthen, especially if it is in the best interests of industry participants. 
International business and public policy scholars (e.g., Haufler, 2003; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; 
Wotruba, 1997) note that self-regulation became more prominent on a global scale because 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) were experiencing operational and reputational challenges due 
to cross-national heterogeneity in standards and increased resistance from transnational activism 
campaigns protesting their business practices. Since supranational and intergovernmental 
organizations were either weak or non-existent, firms and industry associations had to be 
proactive and collaborate across borders to overcome various forms of market failure and 
continue international operations successfully (O’Rourke, 2003; Vogel, 2010). In this example, 
self-regulation substituted for government-regulation, which did not exist on a global scale. 
Since public and private organizations may have different approaches to regulation due to 
their innate differences, firms are strongly motivated to use industry self-regulation as a means to 
preempt government-regulation, and self-regulation can be used to fill institutional voids left by 
weak governments, it is possible that industry government-regulation and self-regulation are 
substitutes.  
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between industry government-regulation and self-
regulation is substitutive.  
 While self-regulation, particularly in the financial sector, is typically credited with being 
more flexible and capable of preserving industry stability efficiently and without stifling 
innovation and competitiveness (Pagliari, 2012), perhaps this is mostly the case in relatively 
stable economic conditions. A major crisis, however, may serve as a revelation to government 
officials that they should be more involved in oversight of the industry.  
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Governments (even at the supranational level like the Basle Committee and Bank for 
International Settlements) are typically equipped with the necessary tools and regulatory 
mechanisms to provide safety nets for firms in the event of a major crisis. Governments can 
quickly leverage their lender-of-last-resort and prudential regulation and supervision 
mechanisms to quell global financial panics (Helleiner, 1995). Receipt of government assistance 
during a crisis is likely to come with strings attached in the form of restrictions of activities and 
increased oversight, much like the conditions that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank affix to assistance given to economies that are in crisis. Additionally, it may be easy 
for the government to respond to a crisis because in many cases, government actors will take 
previously introduced self-regulatory measures and make them mandatory, while backing them 
up with the coercive authority of the state (Pagliari, 2012). There is some evidence that 
regulations after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 were actually quite similar; however, 
authority shifted to the hands of government actors and compliance became mandatory for many 
things that were previously voluntary.  
Government actors are under increased political pressure from domestic and international 
audiences during times of crisis. Elected government officials, in particular, are held accountable 
by the electorate and have substantial concerns about how political groups view their actions 
(Hanssen, 1999). Even if top government regulators are appointed to their positions, their actions 
tend to project onto the elected official that appointed them. Financial regulatory politics, in 
particular, have become increasingly politicized (Pagliari, 2012), as evidenced by the 
international Occupy movement following the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, which further 
magnifies the level of scrutiny to which government officials are subjected. During a financial 
crisis, the general public expects immediate action from the government in order to stabilize the 
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economy and protect the general welfare of the people. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) state, 
“When bad things happen to lots of people’s money, governments have to respond. Moreover, 
these mass publics have been international” (p. 122). Due to globalization and a highly integrated 
global financial system, government officials are not only held accountable by their electorate, 
but also by members of the international community who are directly and indirectly affected by 
financial crises.  
When faced with a major crisis, private industry actors may become quite limited in their 
abilities to re-stabilize the industry while simultaneously trying to get a handle on the internal 
crises occurring within their own firms. In reference to international financial markets, Helleiner 
(1995) explains that during global financial crises, firms within the financial sector tend to retreat 
to the perceived safety and familiarity of their domestic markets, which, without government 
intervention, could result in a substantial collapse in the movement of international capital flows. 
Although firms in the industry may be negatively affected by a major crisis, their main priority is 
to increase and sustain the value of the firm’s owners. Managers may not want their operations 
and strategies to be limited by increased regulation, especially when trying to run a business 
during times of crisis. McCaffrey and Hart (1998) explain that although financial sector firms 
generally do want to engage in responsible business practices and refrain from harming their 
customers and clients, they have no desire to enforce or engage in any regulatory practices that 
will restrict their income and control over their own work. Firms that are relatively strong and 
healthy (even during a crisis) may not want to be held to more regulations and restrictions just 
because weaker firms are experiencing difficulty. During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, healthy 
firms were encouraged by the U.S. government to take bailout money, and abide by the 
restrictions that came with receipt of those funds, such as increased government scrutiny and 
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limits on executive compensation. They were encouraged to do so in order to stimulate lending 
and refrain from stigmatizing the weaker firms in the industry that really needed the funds 
(Cadman, Carter, & Lynch, 2012; Cornett, Li, & Tehranian, 2013). 
History shows that regulators (particularly in the financial sector) tend to respond quickly 
in response to crisis. During the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 American and European 
financial regulators and other government officials were able to inject trillions of dollars of 
capital into struggling firms, virtually overnight with the sign of a pen. Private industry actors 
and organizations were not capable of tackling such a feat because they lacked access to the 
amount of capital needed to stabilize financial markets on their own.  
Research on major financial crises throughout history reveals that government actors also 
tend to strengthen the regulation of financial markets and significantly change the allocation of 
oversight between public and private regulation to more of the former. For example, after the 
market crash of 1929 in the U.S., regulators enacted the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which 
restricted the freedom of U.S. banks to operate in the securities market. The U.S. government 
also created a new regulatory institution, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to 
enforce federal securities laws and oversee self-regulatory organizations (e.g., stock exchanges) 
in the securities industry. Similarly, following the international stock market crash of 1987, 
government securities regulators recognized the need to extend their authority over international 
securities markets, and subsequently formed the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), which develops and monitors adherence to global standards for 
securities regulation. Most recently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act was signed into U.S. law in direct response to the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009. This law significantly increased regulation and oversight over virtually all financial sector 
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firms in order to improve financial stability and consumer protection. Although there is historical 
evidence that government intervention tends to increase in the wake of a crisis, we lack evidence 
on the extent to which self-regulation may strengthen or weaken in response to a crisis. 
  When faced with an economic crisis, government institutions have access to substantial 
resources, and can access these resources rather quickly in order to suppress the effects of the 
crisis. Governments also face considerable national and international political pressure to 
respond quickly and effectively respond to a crisis. Firms, however, may experience significant 
constraints on their regulatory abilities while they are trying to stay above water during an 
economic crisis. Lastly, there are historical cases that offer evidence of strong and swift 
regulatory action from governments during a crisis. Thus, I suggest that industry government-
regulation responds to economic crises more strongly and quickly than industry self-regulation. 
 Hypothesis 3a: Industry government-regulation responds to a global financial crisis 
more strongly than industry self-regulation. 
Hypothesis 3b: Industry government-regulation responds to a global financial crisis 
more quickly than industry self-regulation. 
METHOD 
Data 
In this study, I use data for 71 countries covering the years 2001-2013, resulting in an 
unbalanced panel dataset of 616 country-year observations. To test my principal variables of 
government-regulation and self-regulation, I utilized the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013) cross-
national Bank Regulation and Supervision Database. The database creators employ survey data 
obtained from senior banking supervisors at central banks and other regulatory agencies in 148 
countries, making this database robust. The data from these surveys reflect actual and perceived 
 45 
aspects of a country’s bank regulatory environment. The survey data are organized into 51 
distinct indices that measure capital requirements, ownership restrictions, deposit insurance 
generosity, allowable activities, and other regulatory and supervisory policies. The measures for 
the explanatory and control variables are collected from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial Development (GFDD) databases, the United National 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
and The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom.  
Variables and measures 
The variables and associated measures used in this study are summarized in Table 3.1 
and explained in detail below. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.1 here 
------------------------------ 
Dependent variables. Within this study, I use two dependent variables to test the 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation, and 
their responses to economic crisis. The variables government-regulation and self-regulation are 
measured using data from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Database (Barth, Caprio, & 
Levine, 2013). The 51 indices in the database are grouped into ten major categories; however, I 
use the indices in five of the major categories to measure the government-regulation variable. 
The five categories include: banking activity regulations, financial conglomerate regulations, 
competition regulations, capital regulations, and supervisory action regulations. Salomon and 
Wu (2012) use the first four categories to construct their measure for bank regulatory distance; 
however, I chose to include also the fifth category (supervisory action regulations) in order to 
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capture the scope of the authority and independence of government actors over the financial 
services sector. To compute the final government-regulation measure, I use the sum of a 
country’s score in each category, with higher values indicating stronger government-regulation 
over the banking sector. I provide detailed descriptions of the five categories used to calculate 
the measure for government-regulation in Table 3.2. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.2 here 
------------------------------- 
Self-regulation, the second dependent variable is measured by the private monitoring 
category within the Bank Regulation and Supervision Database. According to Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2008), private monitoring reflects the extent to which there are incentives and/or the 
ability for private organizations to monitor banks. Values of this variable reside within the range 
of 0 to 12, with higher values indicating stronger industry self-regulation. 
Independent variables. To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, I utilize different variables to 
represent the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. When testing how strongly government-
regulation and self-regulation respond to an economic crisis, I use the variable crisis, which is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the year is 2007 or later. Following Pagliari (2012), which also 
acknowledges the global financial crisis as occurring between 2007-2009, I use 2007 as the 
beginning of the global financial crisis, as this marked the point at which the U.S. housing 
market started to free-fall. I also include the years in this dataset that follow the end of the 
financial crisis (2010-2013) in order to capture additional regulatory responses and to account for 
the fact that the Eurozone crisis lasted well into 2013. When testing how quickly government-
regulation and self-regulation respond to crisis, I use the variables crisis year 1, crisis year 2, 
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crisis year 3, and post-crisis to capture regulatory responses at different points in time during the 
crisis. All four variables are time dummies, and are explained in detail in Table 3.1. 
Control variables. I control for several country-level factors that are likely to have a 
significant effect on financial sector regulation, based on previous research. Specifically, the 
control variables in this study include, interest rate spread, competition, inflation, overall FDI 
stock, government stability, and education. Interest rate spread is a common proxy for 
profitability in the financial sector, and is measured as the difference between the interest rate 
charged by banks on loans, and the interest rate paid by banks for deposits. Since industry 
profitability may be a determinant of self-regulation policies in particular, it is important to 
control for this variable.  
Competition in the financial sector is commonly measured using the Boone indicator, 
which is calculated as the elasticity of profits to marginal costs. The Boone indicator rests on the 
idea that competition enhances the performance of efficient firms and lowers the performance of 
inefficient firms (van Leuvensteijn, Bikker, van Rixtel, & Sorensen, 2007). A lack of 
competition in the financial sector is likely to trigger increased involvement from government 
regulators; however, firms within the industry may be more likely to encourage self-regulation 
that minimizes competition in the industry.   
I control for inflation, as it is likely to encourage more government intervention, 
especially when inflation increases. Inflation is measured by the consumer price index. Overall 
FDI stock is measured as the stock of FDI across all industries within a country, relative to GDP. 
The extent of foreign investment in a country is likely to have an impact on the overall 
regulatory environment. Some research suggests that regulatory environments may strengthen in 
order to provide more security and reassurance to foreign investors (Henisz & Zelner, 2005; 
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Meyer & Sinani, 2009). However, other research suggests regulatory environments may weaken 
in order to attract and appease foreign investors who may be shopping around for favorable 
regulatory environments (Spar & Yoffie, 1999). Additionally, Bu and Wagner (2016) find that 
firms are attracted to either stringent or weak regulatory environments depending on firm 
characteristics.  
I control for government stability because a lack of stability may encourage more action 
from private organizations in the form of self-regulation. Government stability is measured as the 
monthly average of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) government stability index. 
More details about this measure and the ICRG’s conceptualization of government stability are 
provided in Table 1. Education is measured as the average duration (in years) that individuals in 
the country spend in primary school. I control for education because previous research indicates 
that the average level of education (a proxy for human capital) in the country is a determinant of 
the sophistication of the regulatory environment, and the institutional environment as a whole 
(Sinclair, 1997; Tabellini, 2010). 
Model specification 
I include summary statistics and correlations of all variables (except the crisis variables) 
and measures in Table 3.3. All correlations are below 0.80 and the variables produce a mean 
variance inflation factor of 3.66 indicating that there are no major multicollinearity concerns 
(Farrar & Glauber, 1967; Robinson & Schumacker, 2009).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.3 here 
------------------------------ 
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The equations used to test each hypothesis utilize the dynamic panel data method of including a 
lagged dependent variable to account for the fact that changes in regulation are likely a function 
of the previous state of the regulation, as is common with political processes (Keele & Kelly, 
2006). As such, failure to include the lagged dependent variable could lead to estimation and 
interpretation problems resulting from autocorrelation and omitted variable bias (Keele & Kelly, 
2006). In addition to the lagged dependent variable, all other independent and control variables 
(except the crisis variables) are lagged one year in order to minimize the threat of serial 
correlation, help establish causality, and reduce concerns for reverse causation (Kennedy, 2009). 
Using a Hausman test, I verified that it was appropriate to estimate a random effects model. 
Performing a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test further corroborated the 
appropriateness of a random effects model, and indicated that there are no serial or 
contemporaneous correlation concerns. However, I include country and year fixed effects in 
order to control for the time-invariant factors that may influence regulations. Additionally, I 
incorporate corrections for heteroskedasticity by including Huber-White robust standard errors. 
Since estimating dynamic panel models with OLS runs the risk of producing biased 
results (Gujarati & Porter, 2009), I also estimate each equation using generalized method of 
moments (GMM) procedures. By including a first difference transformation that provides 
instruments for the lagged dependent variable, GMM provides estimators that are typically more 
efficient and robust than OLS estimation (Woolridge, 2010). The GMM tests do not include 
fixed effects; however, they do include robust standard errors. 
In order to test the extent to which self-regulation precedes government-regulation 




Following estimation techniques used by Clausing (2000), which tests for a 
complementary or substitutive relationship between international trade and multinational 
activity, I test the extent to which government-regulation and self-regulation are complements or 
substitutes (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) using OLS and GMM procedures. Clausing (2000) uses 
cross-price effects to determine the extent of a complementary or substitutive relationship. The 
general concept behind this approach is that if a price variable that would theoretically affect 
only one of the regulation types also affects the other regulation type, then there is a complement 
or substitution effect present. If both regulations significantly respond to the same price in the 
same direction, then they are complements. However, the regulations are substitutes if they 
significantly respond to the same price variables in opposite directions. Clausing’s (2000) 
approach is econometrically sophisticated because it minimizes endogeneity concerns that are 
present in models that assess complementarity or substitution by incorporating one focal variable 
as the dependent variable and the other variable in the proposed relationship as an independent 
variable. When using a less sophisticated approach, it is likely that the independent variable will 
have a statistically significant coefficient estimate, suggesting that there is either a 
complementary or a substitutive relationship. However, it is likely that the independent variable 
is picking up the effect of an omitted variable; thus, causing endogeneity concerns. Clausing’s 
(2000) cross-price elasticity approach, however, combats this potential endogeneity problem.  
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I use government stability as a price for government-regulation because when there is 
instability and transition occurring within the government, it tends to be more difficult and costly 
for government officials to agree on regulations and adequately monitor firms. Furthermore, I 
introduce the variable polcon as another price variable that may affect government-regulations. 
Henisz (2000) introduced the polcon variable as a measure of political constraints, which reflects 
the degree of constraints on policy change. Since having more constraints and veto points within 
a political system would make conducting government-regulation more difficult and costly, I 
include this variable as a price for government-regulation. 
I use government spending as a price for self-regulation because the expenditures that the 
government spends on legislating and running the country, serve as a proxy of the government’s 
capacity to build and support its institutions. A government that spends little money, or that does 
not have the capacity to spend, is not likely to invest adequately in its regulatory environment; 
thus placing the regulatory burden on the private sector. Additionally, I include the price variable 
market concentration, which reflects the degree to which the financial sector in a country is 
concentrated. Self-regulation involves collective action and coordination across the firms within 
an industry. However, the coordination costs may become very high if the industry is 
fragmented. I include details regarding the measures for polcon and market concentration in 
Table 1.1.   




To examine how government-regulation and self-regulation respond to an economic 
crisis, I use OLS and GMM procedures to employ Equations 4 and 5 asses the strength and 
Equations 6 and 7 to assess the speed with which each type of regulation responds. Since my key 
independent variables in these equations are essentially time dummies, I do not include year 
fixed effects in these models. Equations 4 and 5 are used to test Hypothesis 3a, and Equations 6 







The regression results for Equation 1 (Hypothesis 1) are displayed in Table 3.4, with 
Model 1 showing the coefficient estimates of the control variables and the lagged dependent 
variable, and Models 2 and 3 showing the full model specification using OLS and GMM 
procedures respectively.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.4 here 
------------------------------- 
As expected, lagged values of government-regulation have a statistically significant effect on 
current values of government-regulation, such that increases in government-regulation in the 
previous year are likely to result in increases in government-regulation in the current year. 
Although including a lagged dependent variable in a model specification tends to make other 
right hand side variables less significant, overall FDI stock maintains a statistically significant 
effect on government-regulation across all three models in Table 3.4. According to all three 
models, a one-unit increase in a country’s overall FDI stock (relative to GDP) contributes to a 
0.01 unit decrease in the strength of a country’s government-regulations, supporting the research 
that suggests regulations may weaken in order to attract and appease foreign investors who may 
want to engage in regulatory arbitrage.  
The GMM estimation results in Model 3 show statistically significant results for the 
interest rate spread and education control variables. Specifically, a one-unit increase in the 
interest rate spread leads to a 0.18 unit decrease in the strength of government-regulations, and a 
one-unit increase in a country’s education level leads to a 4.64 unit increase in the strength of 
government-regulations. Higher levels of education are typically associated with stronger 
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institutional and regulatory environments; however, the statistically negative effect on the 
interest rate spread variables suggests that government actors may have less incentive to 
intervene in the financial sector when the industry as a whole is experiencing increased levels of 
profitability. 
 The key variable of interest in Table 3.4 is self-regulation, which has a positive effect in 
Model 2 (OLS) and negative effect in Model 3 (GMM); however, neither estimate shows 
statistical significance. Therefore, there is no evidence corroborating that changes in self-
regulation generally precede changes in government-regulation. As a robustness check, I 
conducted a Granger (1969) causality test, to test the extent to which government-regulation is 
related to past values of itself as well as that of self-regulation. Specifically, the Granger 
causality test is used to determine whether one variable (self-regulation) precedes another 
variable (government-regulation). The null hypothesis for the causality test is that self-regulation 
does not precede government-regulation. I tested the causality of the two types of regulation in 
both directions using two lags of both variables. The results of the test are provided in Table 3.5, 
and the F-statistic values indicate that there is no causality in either direction. As such, there is 
no additional evidence corroborating that self-regulation precedes government-regulation; 
therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.5 here 
------------------------------ 
 Hypotheses 2a and 2b test whether the relationship between government-regulation and 
self-regulation is complementary or substitutive respectively. The results of these tests are 
presented in Table 3.6 with Models 1 and 2 showing the OLS results and Models 3 and 4 
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showing the GMM results. Neither price variable (polcon, government stability, market 
concentration, and government spending) has a statistically significant effect on both types of 
regulations within the OLS or GMM specifications. Thus, there is no empirical support for either 
a complementary or a substitutive relationship between government-regulation and self-
regulation. Neither Hypothesis 2a, nor Hypothesis 2b is supported. However, it is interesting that 
market concentration, which is theorized to be a price for self-regulation, actually has a positive 
and statistically significant relationship with government-regulation in the OLS model. This may 
reflect the anti-trust concerns that government regulators may have when an industry’s market 
share is highly concentrated. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.6 here 
------------------------------ 
 Hypothesis 3a predicts that government-regulation responds more strongly than self-
regulation when there is an economic crisis. Overall, Hypothesis 3a is supported, as shown by 
the results in Table 3.7.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.7 here 
------------------------------ 
Models 1 and 2 provide the OLS and GMM (respectively) tests for government-regulation’s 
response to crisis, while Models 3 and 4 provide the OLS and GMM (respectively) tests for self-
regulation’s response to crisis. In Model 1, the crisis variable, which accounts for the years 2007 
and beyond, is positive and statistically significant, indicating that a year during and after the 
crisis results in a 1-unit increase in the strength of government-regulations. These results; 
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however, are not corroborated by GMM estimation, which shows positive, yet statistically 
insignificant coefficient estimate for the crisis variable in Model 2. Taken together, the results 
from Models 1 and 2 suggest that it is likely that government-regulations strengthen during and 
after a crisis; however, the results should be interpreted with caution, as they are not robust 
across different estimation techniques. Models 3 and 4 show negative and statistically significant 
coefficient estimates for the crisis variable’s effect on self-regulation. Specifically, OLS (Model 
3) suggests a 0.21 unit decrease in the strength of self-regulation during and after a crisis, and 
GMM (Model 4) suggests a 0.51 unit decrease in the strength of self-regulation during and after 
a crisis. Since there is some evidence that government-regulation strengthens, and further 
evidence that self-regulation weakens during times of economic crisis, Hypothesis 3a is 
supported. 
 Lastly, Table 3.8 provides evidence regarding the extent to which government-regulation 
responds more quickly than self-regulation during an economic crisis, with Models 1 and 2 
showing response of government-regulation and Models 3 and 4 showing the response of self-
regulation. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3.8 here 
------------------------------ 
The OLS test for government-regulation (Model 1) indicates that government-regulation 
responds during each year of the crisis and after the crisis by strengthening. However, the GMM 
test (Model 2) only provides evidence of government-regulations responding during the second 
year of the crisis. Models 3 (OLS) and 4 (GMM) show that self-regulation responds during each 
year of the crisis by weakening, and the GMM test in Model 4 further suggests that self-
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regulation continues to weaken after the crisis. Taken together, the results in Table 8 do not 
provide evidence of government-regulation responding more quickly than self-regulation. 
Between OLS and GMM tests, there is actually more robust support for self-regulation 
responding more quickly than government-regulation. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is not supported. 
DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between government-regulation 
and self-regulation and their responses during an economic crisis, using the context of the global 
financial services sector and the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Findings from this research 
provide useful insights into the functioning of complex regulatory environments by incorporating 
quantitative empirical tests and analysis. Although the literature on industry self-regulation 
suggests that it tends to take the lead on establishing rules and standards ahead of government 
actors, the empirical findings of this study do not support this claim. In fact, there is no evidence 
that either type of regulation precedes the other.   
One possible explanation for this non-result may be the free-rider effect that oftentimes 
exists when firms stand to benefit from not complying with self-regulatory directives, while 
other firms do (Ostrom, 1990). This typically results in larger firms and firms with more to lose 
when the industry is negatively impacted taking on the brunt and costs of voluntarily self-
regulating, rather than all firms in the industry doing their fair share. A lack of full participation 
in self-regulation from all firms within an industry may not be enough of a driving force to 
influence changes in government-regulations.  
Nevertheless, I encourage researchers to continue to investigate the causality relationship 
between the two types of regulations within different industries to determine if this relationship 
may be context-specific. Additionally, this study did not find evidence of a complementary or a 
 58 
substitutive relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation. These results do not 
support what other scholars have theorized and examined through case studies regarding the 
relationship between the two types of regulations. In fact, these empirical results suggest that 
government-regulation and self-regulation may be independent of each other.  
This study provides additional insight into the effectiveness of government-regulation 
and self-regulation by examining how each type of regulation responds when shocked by a major 
economic crisis. Empirical findings from this study provide evidence that government-regulation 
strengthens during times of crisis, whereas self-regulation weakens during times of crisis. 
However, government-regulation does not necessarily respond more quickly than self-regulation 
during a crisis. In fact, there was stronger support that self-regulation, although it weakens, has a 
quicker response to an economic crisis than government-regulation. 
Although the empirical findings from this study challenge the conventional wisdom, their 
generalizability may be limited since I explore the hypotheses within one industry. This 
limitation is common in industry self-regulation research since these regulations are typically 
industry-specific. However, I encourage researchers to find empirically sound approaches to 
include additional industries into one study. Doing so would increase our knowledge of the 
relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation and the effectiveness of each 
type of regulation across various contexts.  
This study makes considerable contributions to the literature on industry self-regulation 
by increasing our understanding of how firms and other private organizations regulate their 
industries during stable and volatile economic conditions. While self-regulation may have some 
advantages over government-regulation, especially its ability to respond quickly to changes in 
the business environment, we may not be able to place too much faith in firms’ ability to regulate 
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when facing an economic crisis. Although self-regulation responds to an economic crisis just as 
quickly, or even more quickly than government-regulation, data suggest that firms loosen their 
standards and oversight during times when society may need stronger regulations and 
interventions the most. This tendency can have (and has had) detrimental effects on national and 
international populations when this occurs in the financial services sector or when capital flows 
are directly affected. As such, it may be more appropriate for government regulators to be less 
‘hands-off’ when regulating financial services firms. I recommend that researchers conduct more 
studies that examine firms’ self-regulatory behavior and initiatives during stable and turbulent 
conditions to provide additional insight on how self-regulation works and the extent to which it 
is effective under various conditions. Research along this stream is likely to provide important 
insights and implications for academic scholars, business practitioners, and policymakers. 
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TABLES  
Table 3.1 Variables and Measures 
 
Variable Measure Data Source 
Government-regulation Combination of five 
indices from the Bank 
Regulation and 
Supervision Database:  
(1) Bank Activities, 
(2) Conglomerates, 
(3) Capital,  
(4) Competition, and 
(5) Supervisory Action. 
Values can be equal to or 
greater than 8, with 
higher values indicating 
stronger government-
regulations. 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Database 
(Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2013) 
   Self-Regulation Private Monitoring index 
from the Bank 
Regulation and 
Supervision Database. 
This index measures the 
extent to which there are 
incentives/ability for the 
private monitoring of 
firms. Values can fall 
within the range of 0 to 
12 with higher values 
indicating more private 
monitoring. 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Database 
(Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2013) 
   Crisis Binary variable equal to 1 
if the year is 2007 or 
later; and 0 otherwise 
 
   Post Crisis Binary variable equal to 1 
if the year is after 2009; 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
   Crisis Year 1 
Crisis Year 2 
Crisis Year 3 
Binary variable equal to 1 
if the year is 2007, 2008, 
or 2009 respectively; and 
0 otherwise 
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Table 3.1 Variables and Measures (cont.) 
 
Interest Rate Spread The difference between 
the interest rate charged 
by banks on loans to 
private sector customers 
and the interest rate paid 
by commercial or similar 
banks for demand, time, 
or savings deposits. 
Proxy for profitability in 
the financial services 
sector. 
World Bank WDIs 
   Competition Boone Indicator, which is 
calculated as the 
elasticity of profits to 
marginal costs. I rescaled 
this measure so that an 
increase in the Boone 
Indicator implies an 
increase in the 
competitive conduct of 
financial intermediaries. 
Global Financial Development Database 
   Inflation Inflation, as measured by 
the consumer price index, 
reflects the annual 
percentage change in the 
cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a 
basket of goods and 
services.  
World Bank WDIs 
   Overall FDI Stock FDI stock (across all 
industries) in a country as 
a percent of GDP. 
UNCTAD 
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Table 3.1 Variables and Measures (cont.) 
 
Government Stability Monthly average of the 
ICRG government 
stability index. 
Government stability is a 
measure of both the 
government’s ability to 
carry out its declared 
program(s), and its ability 
to stay in office. The risk 
rating is a sum of three 
subcomponents (each 
with a maximum score of 
4 points and a minimum 
score of 0): Government 
Unity, Legislative 
Strength, and Popular 
Support. Values can 
range from a score of 12 
(very low risk) to 0 (very 
high risk).  
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
   Government Spending Considers the level of 
government expenditures 




transfers, account for the 
entire score.  
The Heritage Foundation’s Economic 
Freedom Index 
   Education Duration (years) in 
primary school 
World Bank WDIs 
   Polcon Polcon V, which 
measures the degree of 
constraints on policy 
change, based on the 
number of independent 
veto points in the 
political system. 
Henisz (2000) The institutional environment 
for economic growth. Economics and 
Politics, 12(1): 1-31. 
https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1327 
   Market Concentration Assets of the three largest 
commercial banks as a 
share of total commercial 
banking assets. 
Global Financial Development Database 
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Table 3.2 Five Categories Within Industry Regulations Measure 
 
Industry Regulations 
Category Description Range of Values 
Banking Activity Regulations Extent to which banks may 
engage in securities, 
insurance, and real estate 
activities. 
3 (less restrictive)  
to  
12 (more restrictive) 
Financial Conglomerate 
Regulations 
Extent to which banks may 
own and control nonfinancial 
firms, nonfinancial firms may 
own and control banks, and 
nonbank financial firms may 
own and control banks. 
3 (less restrictive)  
to  
12 (more restrictive) 
Competition Regulations Degree of difficulty in 
obtaining approval to enter the 
banking sector (for domestic 
and foreign firms). 
0 (less restrictive)  
to  
15 (more restrictive) 
Capital Regulations Extent to which capital 
requirements reflect certain 
risk elements, and whether 
certain funds may be used to 
capitalize a bank. 
0 (less stringent)  
to  
10 (more stringent) 
Supervisory Action 
Regulations 
Extent of power given to 
supervisory authorities to take 
specific actions to intervene in 
bank activities, restructure and 
reorganized a troubled bank, 
and declare a bank insolvent. 
Also measures the degree to 
which the courts dominate 
supervisory authority. 
2 (less powerful)  
to  
no max (more powerful) 
 
Note: Information retrieved from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) 
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
No. Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 
Government-
regulation 49.50 6.52 29 68 1                 
  
2 Self-Regulation 7.99 1.44 4 11 0.14 1          
3 Interest Rate Spread 7.81 6.97 -1.37 55.80 0.05 -0.05 1         
4 Competition -0.34 0.15 -1 0.59 -0.14 -0.06 0.17 1        
5 Inflation 5.40 5.95 -18.11 54.92 0.20 -0.26 0.24 0.11 1       
6 Overall FDI Stock 52.09 129.62 0.76 1810.29 -0.11 0.09 -0.17 0.00 -0.22 1      
7 Government Stability 8.37 1.61 4.04 12 -0.08 0.01 -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 1     
8 Government Spending 64.47 23.43 0 97.6 0.27 -0.03 0.22 -0.04 0.20 -0.07 0.04 1    
9 Education 5.57 0.98 3 8 -0.02 0.00 -0.19 -0.15 -0.04 0.10 0.08 0.19 1   
10 Polcon 0.53 0.28 0 0.89 -0.28 0.04 -0.16 0.04 -0.20 0.15 -0.08 -0.48 -0.14 1  
11 Market Concentration 68.57 19.35 21.42 100 -0.13 0.09 -0.03 -0.10 -0.22 0.30 0.04 -0.26 0.19 0.16 1 
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Table 3.4 Regression Results for Government-regulation 
 
Government-regulations 
  OLS  GMM 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Self-Regulation t-1 
 
0.07  -0.12 
  
(0.16)  (0.20) 
Government-regulation t-1 0.74*** 0.73***  0.35*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) 
Interest Rate Spread t-1 -0.02 -0.02  -0.18* 
 
(0.05) (0.06)  (0.10) 
Competition t-1 -0.48 -0.65  -1.29 
 
(1.29) (1.35)  (1.17) 
Inflation t-1 0.02 0.02  -0.03 
 
(0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
Overall FDI Stock t-1 -0.01*** -0.01***  -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Government Stability t-1 0.08 0.09  -0.34 
 
(0.14) (0.14)  (0.24) 
Government Spending t-1 -0.02 -0.02  0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) 
Education t-1 -0.57 -0.58  4.64* 
 
(1.04) (1.05)  (2.52) 
Constant 15.05** 14.49**  11.43 
  (6.69) (6.80)  (14.21) 
Observations 506 495  495 
No. of Countries 62 62  62 
R-squared 0.85 0.85   
Chi-squared significant Yes Yes  Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes  No 
Year FE Yes Yes  No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 





Table 3.5 Granger Causality Between Government-regulation and Self-Regulation 
 
H0: X does not cause Y 
Direction of Causality F-Value F-Statistic Decision 
Self-Regulation à 
Government-regulation 
0.00 0.97 Do not reject 
Government-regulation à 
Self-Regulation 
0.02 0.88 Do not reject 
Note: The Granger causality test must be conducted on a strongly balanced panel. As such, the 
panel was reduced to 420 country-year observations. 
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  OLS   GMM 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 3 




























Government-regulation t-1 0.72***   0.75***  
 (0.03)   (0.07)  
Self-Regulation t-1  0.72***   0.84*** 
  (0.03)   (0.05) 



































Constant 13.92*** 4.93*** 
 
3.70 2.72*** 
  (9.89) (0.72)   (7.12) (0.91) 
Observations 493 591 
 
493 591 
R-squared 0.85 0.82 
   No. of Countries 60 69 
 
60 69 
Chi-squared significant Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
 
No No 
Year FE Yes Yes   No No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  OLS GMM   OLS GMM 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4 







Government-regulations t-1 0.73*** 0.33*** 
   
 
(0.03) (0.05) 
   Self-Regulation t-1 
   
0.71*** 0.26*** 
    
(0.03) (0.04) 

















































Constant 17.39*** 9.50 
 
4.93*** 7.50*** 
  (6.38) (12.88)   (0.80) (1.15) 
Observations 506 506 
 
616 616 
No. of Countries 62 62 
 
71 71 
R-squared 0.84   0.81  
Chi-squared significant Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Year FE No No   No No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 69 
  










VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 Model 4 




























Government-regulations t-1 0.74*** 0.34*** 
   
 
(0.02) (0.05) 
   Self-Regulation t-1 
   
0.72*** 0.25*** 
    
(0.03) (0.03) 

















































Constant 16.32** 8.36 
 
4.99*** 7.63*** 
  (6.66) (13.03)   (0.81) (1.18) 
Observations 506 506 
 
616 616 






 Chi-squared significant Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Year FE No No   No No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 – REGULATIONS, REGULATORY AUTHORITY, AND 





 International business (IB) scholars have adopted a general consensus that host country 
institutions matter in the sense that they tend to have a significant effect on inward FDI flows 
(Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Xing & Kolstad, 2002). 
While there has been considerable advancement within the literature on institutions and 
internationalization through contributions from a multitude of theoretical and empirical studies, 
the vast majority of this research is focused on institutions at the national level. In reality, 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) must engage with and strategize around various types of 
institutions in multiple countries and at different levels when conducting international business 
activities. For example, a multinational financial service firm such as Barclays PLC has to 
navigate national-level regulations that apply to all firms in the United Kingdom and other 
countries (such as the United States), while simultaneously operating within the confines of 
industry-specific regulations in the countries in which it conducts business.  
The IB discipline; however, has left the influences of institutional environments at 
multiple levels of the economy largely understudied (Zhou & Peng, 2010). Existing research in 
the institutions and internationalization literature has not presented adequate theories and 
frameworks to tackle the complexity of various institutions interacting simultaneously. 
Subsequently, there is a call amongst management scholars in general, and IB scholars in 
particular, for more research that include various forms and levels of institutions (Ang, 
Benischke, & Doh, 2015). Zhou & Peng (2010) specifically emphasize that more research is 
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needed on the interaction between institutional structures at different levels, as this is currently a 
weak link in the existing literature. As such, in the present study, I primarily focus on 
investigating the influences of regulations at different levels on the internationalization strategies 
of financial services firms. 
In addition to contending with regulations at various levels, MNEs also operate under 
different types of regulatory authority, particularly at the industry level. Namely, MNEs tend to 
maneuver around industry regulations under the authority of the state (industry regulation 
hereafter) and industry regulations under the authority of peers and other private actors within 
their industries (self-regulation hereafter). Although the concept of regulations operating under 
the authority of the government is rather intuitive, the notion of self-regulation may not be as 
clear. In this study, I adopt the definition of industry self-regulation as a “…regulatory process 
whereby an industry-level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level organization (such as a 
trade association or a professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards relating to the 
conduct of firms in the industry” (Gupta & Lad, 1983: 417). While scholars in other disciplines 
such as economics (Wade, 1987), political science (Sinclair, 1997), and law (Braithwaite, 1982; 
Toffel & Short, 2011) have, and continue to debate about the extent to which public or private 
sector actors are best suited to effectively establish, monitor, and enforce regulations, particularly 
in the financial services sector, the IB community has been largely silent. 
As a highly regulated industry, firms in the financial services sector are subject to various 
regulatory forces at the national and industry levels. While there is a large, established literature 
on the institutional determinants of inward FDI, we still have a limited understanding of how 
various regulatory environments influence foreign investment decisions in the financial services 
sector. This is a concern, as financial sector FDI in particular is sensitive to changes in regulatory 
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environments (Adams, Debrah, Williams, & Mmieh, 2015; Buch, 2003; Goldberg & Grosse, 
1994; Huizinga, Voget, & Wagner, 2014). Financial sector FDI helps foster financial sector 
development around the world (especially in developing countries), and plays a significant role 
in a country’s ability to attract, sustain, and reap the benefits of non-financial sector FDI. In 
addition to the economic importance of studying the regulatory determinants of inward financial 
sector flows, managers of financial sector firms have substantial interest in regulations, as their 
business operations are heavily influenced by them (Salomon & Wu, 2012).  
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to provide an examination of national-level and 
industry-level regulations in the context of firm internationalization. Although national-level 
regulations typically fall under the purview of the government, both public and private actors 
may have authority over industry-level regulations; therefore, this study also considers how 
regulatory authority plays a role in MNEs’ internationalization decisions. This study is motivated 
by the following research question: To what extent are host country national-level regulations, 
industry-level regulations, and industry self-regulation effective at attracting foreign direct 
investment in the financial services sector? By incorporating an institution-based analysis 
grounded in new institutional economics, I empirically examine how host country regulations at 
different levels and under the authority of public and private actors affect FDI inflows in the 
financial services sector. The empirical findings from this research can offer contributions to the 
new institutional economics and internationalization literatures by showing how a diversity of 
regulations as well as regulatory authority in the host country matter, and may matter differently, 
in the context of attracting FDI. 
This study proceeds by first drawing on the existing literature on new institutional 
economics and internationalization, as well as the self-regulation literature as a foundation for 
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my proposed theoretical model. This theoretical model highlights the mechanisms that allow host 
country regulations and regulatory authority to affect inward FDI in the financial services sector. 
Following the theoretical model and testable hypotheses, I provide a description of the data, 
measures, and methodology used to test empirically my proposed model. The paper will close 
with a thorough discussion of the empirical findings, as well as the implications that they present 
for the research and practitioner communities. Additionally, the discussion section will conclude 
with an assessment of the contributions of this study as well as its limitations, which may serve 
as motivation for future research. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Host country institutions and inward FDI: A New Institutional Economics Perspective 
 There is an abundance of empirical support in the existing IB literature for the notion that 
formal host country institutional environments have a significant effect on inward FDI (e.g., 
Kang & Jiang, 2012; Meyer et al., 2009; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). The formal institutional 
environment is largely comprised of human-devised, codified rules and standards that shape 
human interaction (North, 1990). Formal institutions are what Scott (1995) identifies as 
regulative institutions, which focus on rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning (Scott, 2008). 
Some characteristics of a country with a strong formal institutional environment include strong 
property rights protection, mechanisms for contract enforcement, political stability, an adequate 
legal system for settling disputes, and lack of corruption (Delios & Beamish, 1999).  
While the formal institutional environment is comprised of several different institutions, 
regulatory, political, and economic institutions are typically the most important to managers. 
(Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2011). However, the emphasis throughout this study is on 
regulatory institutions. It is important for MNEs to thoroughly consider the quality of these 
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characteristics due to the overarching impact that the institutional environment has over society 
as well as the success of their investment (Contractor, Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014). 
Institutions define acceptable behavior and provide mechanisms for disciplining nonconformists, 
which is helpful for foreign investors when trying to formulate expectations for their investments 
in a potential host country (Holmes et al., 2011). 
According to Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004), the institutional environment has become 
a key locational advantage (or disadvantage), as it has the potential to increase (or decrease) the 
host country’s attractiveness to a potential foreign investor (Dunning, 1998). Strong host country 
institutions, such as a structured and efficient legal system, reduce information asymmetries that 
may typically deter MNEs or result in minimal investment from them (Tong, Reuer, & Peng, 
2008). Additionally, symptoms of weak country-level institutions such as higher levels of 
corruption and political instability tend to increase the costs of engaging in FDI in a host country 
(Meyer, 2001), which may negatively affect the MNE’s profitability.  
My theoretical model (see Figure 4.1) is based on the assumption that strong institutions 
are those that are of high quality and efficiency; yet, not too invasive in the sense that they 
directly control the outcomes of business activity. I adopt the approach used by Meyer et al. 
(2009), which define strong institutions as those that efficiently “…support the voluntary 
exchange underpinning an effective market mechanism” (p. 63). Although the institutions are 
considered strong, business decision-making is still largely in the hands of firms rather than the 
government or any other regulatory authority (Majumdar & Marcus, 2001). Under this view, as 
institutions improve and strengthen in the host country, the environment would be more 
conducive to FDI (Meyer & Sinani, 2009). Therefore, the hypotheses presented in this study are 
based on the new institutional economics prediction that strong host country institutions support 
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markets through structured and efficient legal systems and reducing transaction costs; thus, 
providing location advantages that are likely to encourage investment from MNEs. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4.1 here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Host country national-level regulations and inward FDI 
Regulations at the national-level govern the activities of all firms (domestic and foreign) 
within the country across all industries. These regulations help minimize uncertainty about 
business activity by standardizing practices and mandating conformance through the sanctioning 
powers of the state (Holmes et al., 2011). At the national-level, regulations provide the 
framework for economic interaction and influence the availability of MNEs’ economic 
opportunities (Boddewyn, 1998; North, 1990). Countries with stronger regulations typically 
display evidence of higher economic development in terms of better capital markets and higher 
income per capita (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997), which are host country characteristics that tend to attract foreign 
investors, especially in the financial services sector (Dunning, 1993; Goldberg & Grosse, 1994; 
Yamori, 1998). High economic development in a host country is a good indication of an MNE’s 
potential ability to increase the size of its market and profits by exploiting its strategic 
competitive advantages (Dunning, 2000).  
The strength of a host country’s national-level regulatory environment has specific 
implications for MNEs in the financial services sector due to the direct impact of national-level 
regulations on the financial sector. One of the key characteristics of a host country that financial 
sector MNEs assess is the quality of the local financial system, as it serves as the foundation for 
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the firm’s business activities and profit-making potential (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, & 
Sayek, 2004). According to Kostova & Zaheer (1999), the degree of legitimacy of supporting 
institutions, such as regulations, at the national level could either support or adversely affect a 
country’s financial system. Furthermore, national-level regulatory environments have substantial 
influence over the efficiency of a country’s financial markets (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & 
Levine, 2003).  
Additionally, the strength of national-level regulations influences the interactions that 
financial service MNEs have with their customers, which is a highly salient consideration due to 
the financial services sector’s heavy reliance on forming and sustaining customer relationships 
(Levesque & McDougall, 1996). Since financial services firms have corporate customers that 
operate in various industries, and macro-level regulations extend to firms across virtually all 
industries in a country, it is important that these customers are also held to certain standards, as 
this can directly affect a financial sector MNE’s bottom line. Financial sector MNEs may find 
certain monitoring and enforcement mechanisms ensured by national-level regulations to be 
helpful in providing reassurance that firms (in other industries) with which they may engage for 
business purposes, will adhere to particular and similar standards (Guler & Guillén, 2009; 
Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995). National-level regulations may help provide information about 
customers and their likely behavior, which minimizes information asymmetries and additional 
costs from customer-related risks (Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009). Therefore, host countries 
with strong national-level regulations are likely to attract foreign investment in the financial 
services sector. 
Hypothesis 1: Stronger national-level regulations in the host country increase inward 
FDI flows in the financial services sector. 
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Host country industry regulations and inward FDI 
 In addition to establishing the regulatory environment of the country in general, the state 
typically has the power to establish regulations that are pertinent to specific industries, including 
the financial services industry. While national-level and industry-level regulations may fall under 
the same regulatory authority, it is important to individually examine the mechanisms involved 
in the relationships between the strength of these regulations and inward FDI because different 
institutions are expected to have distinct effects (Holmes et al., 2011). Additionally, Henisz and 
Zelner (2005) explain that credible institutions in a particular sector play a very important role in 
securing new foreign investment, represented by inward FDI flows. 
One aspect of strong and reliable government-regulations at the industry level is that they 
can level the playing field for both domestic and foreign competitors (Rajan & Zingales, 2003). 
When there are weak industry regulations, there is more room for market imperfections (Brewer, 
1993) such as oligopolies and collusion within the industry, which increase the costs of doing 
business in the host country and also serve as barriers to entry for foreign firms (Rajan & 
Zingales, 2003). Market imperfections also minimize the benefits that can be achieved from 
industry self-regulation. According to Gupta and Lad (1983), in highly concentrated industries, 
the standards that result from self-regulatory initiatives are more likely to benefit the firms with 
the most market share. In comparison to industry self-regulatory programs, which tend to be 
based on normative rules and values, government-regulations for an industry are explicit, 
codified, and easier to understand, which minimizes the costs and potential loss in profits 
associated with liability of foreignness that MNEs experience in the host country (Miller & 
Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997).  
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 Strong government oversight in the financial services sector in particular may be 
economically attractive to MNEs in the industry due to the power and resources allocated to 
government actors that may not be given to private organizations that also regulate the industry. 
Greater government involvement in the regulation of the financial services sector may indicate 
the state’s ability to provide a large safety net (e.g., bailouts, emergency loans, deposit insurance, 
and other protective mechanisms) that financial sector MNEs can utilize if necessary (Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine, 2008; Omarova, 2011); thus, minimizing the risk of the investment. 
Furthermore, due to the highly globalized nature of the financial services sector, government-
regulations over the industry in the host country are likely to be aligned with industry regulations 
in other nations (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2008; Isik & Hassan, 2003). This alignment has the 
potential to reduce institutional distance within the financial services sector (depending on the 
home-host country dyad), which translates into reduced costs and an increased likelihood of 
survival in the host country for the MNE (Perkins, 2014; Salomon & Wu, 2012). Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine (2008) provide the example of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which 
established core standards for financial services firms across Islamic countries and subsequently 
stimulated greater international expansion of Islamic banks. Given the preceding benefits of state 
authority over industry-level regulations, I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Stronger industry regulations in the host country increase inward FDI 
flows in the financial services sector. 
Host county industry self-regulation and inward FDI 
 Self-regulation has a rather lengthy tradition in the financial services sectors of most 
countries. For financial services firms, self-regulation can manifest in several ways. Some of the 
more common methods include the use of certified public audits, publishing ratings from 
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reputable international ratings firms, and industry associations that set minimum standards for 
firms within the industry. Although my second hypothesis predicts that strong host country 
financial sector regulations imposed by the government are likely to encourage inward FDI, I 
expect industry regulations imposed by private industry actors to provide similar results. It is 
important to note that government actors and agencies do have some shortcomings that 
oftentimes do not apply to private actors and organizations. First, relative to government actors, 
employees and other individuals within and close to the industry typically have more industry- 
and firm-specific knowledge and skills (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2008). This knowledge 
advantage arguably provides them with a greater capacity to develop and enforce rules that target 
specific activities of financial sector firms and are more appropriate for the sector (Cary, 1963; 
Gunningham & Rees, 1997). 
 Secondly, industry self-regulation programs have the potential to supplement the 
shortcomings of the state’s regulation of the industry (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; King, Lenox, 
& Terlaak, 2005), particularly in developing countries (Delmas, 2009). Private industry actors 
have an informational advantage that puts them in a better position to understand and analyze the 
bottom-up patterns of systemic financial risk (Omarova, 2011), which places them in a better 
position than government actors to set standards for the industry that would help hedge these 
risks. Transactions within a global economy would be very difficult without adequate 
international standards, as MNEs would have to face obstacles from cross-national differences in 
standards. However, industry self-regulation can encourage internationalization activity by 
reducing information asymmetries (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). Additionally, the state 
has limited authority over and insight into a financial sector MNEs’ activities outside of its 
jurisdiction, which consequently limits its ability to effectively regulate and monitor global 
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activity effectively. However, industry private actors, who may also be multinationals, have the 
ability to oversee and manage the activities of financial sector MNEs across borders more 
seamlessly than the government and without the concerns of jurisdictional overreach (Omarova, 
2011). 
 Third, as self-regulation programs are typically the result of collective action of industry 
participants, some collective action scholars suggest that managers may collectively engage in 
voluntary self-regulation programs in order to benefit the entire industry (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 
1987). Establishing self-regulation programs that may be conducive or economically attractive to 
inward FDI may benefit domestic firms and other MNEs in the host country through the 
potential for knowledge, technological, and operational spillovers from MNEs (Meyer & Sinani, 
2009). 
 Finally, industry self-regulation may also minimize an MNE’s concerns of the practice of 
regulatory capture in the host country (Barth, Caprio, & Levin, 2008). Regulatory capture is a 
significant concern in the financial services industry, and typically manifests when financial 
services firms exchange favors with politicians and government regulators who will 
subsequently enact certain policies to promote the private interests of that particular firm (or a 
small set of favored firms) rather than the entire industry (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 20008; Boyer 
& Ponce, 2012). Such private interests may include initiatives that make it more difficult or 
costly for foreign firms to compete in the host country. However, when regulatory authority is 
dispersed across different parties, including private actors, there is less opportunity and incentive 
for regulatory capture (Boyer & Ponce, 2012; Hilary & Lennox, 2005). Therefore, given the 
benefits provided by industry self-regulation in the context of foreign direct investment, I offer 
the following hypothesis: 
 81 
Hypothesis 3: Stronger industry self-regulation in the host country increases inward FDI 
flows in the financial services sector. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data 
 I utilize an unbalanced panel dataset in this study representing 82 countries and 669 
country-year observations that includes net inward financial sector FDI flows during the years 
2001-2013. The FDI data were retrieved from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and include FDI flows in all financial services industries except 
insurance and real estate. The data for the variables of interest were compiled from two 
databases: The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom and the cross-national Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Database (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2013). The national-level 
regulation data were retrieved from the Index of Economic Freedom, which defines 
economically free societies as those in which “…governments allow labor, capital, and goods to 
move freely and refrain from coercion or constraint of liberty beyond the extent necessary to 
protect and maintain liberty (Index of Economic Freedom, 2016). Given that I utilize the 
perspective of strong institutions as those that support and help facilitate business activities in 
this study, this database serves as an appropriate source for measuring the strength of a country’s 
national-level regulations. 
 Industry regulation and industry self-regulation data for the financial services sector were 
obtained from the Barth, Caprio, & Levine (2013) cross-national Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Database. This is a rather robust database; yet, it is highly underutilized in 
management research. It employs survey data obtained from senior banking supervisors at 
central banks and other regulatory agencies in 148 countries covering the years 1999-2013. The 
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data from these surveys reflect actual and perceived aspects of a country’s bank regulatory 
environment. The survey data are organized into 51 distinct indices that measure capital 
requirements, ownership restrictions, deposit insurance generosity, allowable activities, and other 
regulatory and supervisory policies. 
 The measures for the control variables included in my econometric model are collected 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database and Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD). The WDI database integrates a multitude of indicators of a 
country’s level of development, which are collected on an annual basis, contingent upon 
availability. The GFDD provides annual detailed information on a country’s financial system 
characteristics, specifically measures of depth, access, efficiency, and stability. 
Measures and model specification 
 The variables included in this study along with the measures used to operationalize them 
are summarized in Table 4.1 and explained in detail below. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.1 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
 Dependent variable. The objective of this study is to test the influence of various 
regulations on inward FDI flows in the financial services sector. The dependent variable, inward 
FDI, is measured by using annual FDI inflows data retrieved from UNCTAD. In order to have a 
more normal data distribution and to refrain from having large estimators during the regression 
analysis, I measure the dependent variable using the natural log of inward financial sector FDI in 
the host country. 
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 Independent variables. There are three variables of interest, each reflecting the different 
types of host country regulations that may influence the amount of investment into a country’s 
financial services sector. Following the example of studies conducted by Prakash and Potoski 
(2007) and Delis, Molyneux, and Pasiouras (2011), I operationalize the first independent 
variable, national regulations, using data from the Economic Freedom Index. This index is based 
on ten quantitative and qualitative factors grouped into four broad categories of economic 
freedom: rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets. I use the 
regulatory efficiency sub-index to measure the strength of a host country’s national-level 
regulatory environment. The regulatory efficiency sub-index is comprised of three factors with 
each factor given equal weighting: business freedom, labor freedom, and monetary freedom. In 
other words, a country’s regulatory efficiency score is calculated using Equation 1: 
                    (1) 
where E represents the overall regulatory efficiency score used to operationalize the macro 
regulations variable, and the variables on the right-hand side of the equation represent business 
freedom, labor freedom and monetary freedom respectively. Values of regulatory efficiency can 
range from 0 (not free) to 100  (freest). I provide details of the regulatory efficiency sub-index 
and its three indicators in Table 4.2. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.2 here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 The second independent variable is industry regulations, reflecting those under the 
purview of the government, which is measured using data from the Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Database created by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013). This database is comprised 
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of 51 indices that are grouped into ten major categories; however, I used the indices in five of the 
major categories to construct the measure for this variable, as they are the most relevant to my 
conceptualization of financial sector regulations under the authority of the government. These 
five categories are: banking activity regulations, financial conglomerate regulations, competition 
regulations, capital regulations, and supervisory action regulations. Salomon and Wu (2012) use 
the first four categories to construct their measure for bank regulatory distance; however, I chose 
to also include the fifth category (supervisory action regulations) in order to capture the scope of 
the authority and independence of government actors over the financial services sector. I provide 
detailed descriptions of these five categories in Table 4.3. I use the sum of a country’s score in 
each category as the measure for the strength of industry regulations. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.3 here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 The third independent variable is self-regulation, which is measured by the private 
monitoring category within the Bank Regulation and Supervision Database. Private monitoring 
reflects the extent to which there are incentives and/or the ability for private organizations to 
monitor banks. Values of this variable reside within the range of 0 to 12 with higher values 
indicating stronger industry self-regulation. 
 Control variables. In order to capture the effect of the variables of interest, I control for 
host country-related factors that are likely to have a significant effect on inward FDI flows in the 
financial services sector with the variables GDP growth, exchange rate, financial development 
and competition. GDP growth is measured using a country’s annual GDP growth rate, and 
represents the progression of a nation’s economy as well as the potential market size for 
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interested MNEs. The exchange rate data for each country in the dataset are computed relative to 
the U.S. dollar. I control for a country’s exchange rate due to the significant effect that it may 
have on the valuation of an MNE’s assets and its gains (Blonigen, 2005). I use the amount of 
domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks (relative to GDP), as a proxy for the 
financial development variable. The level of a country’s financial development is likely to be a 
significant consideration for financial services MNEs that may be concerned about the 
availability and quality of supporting financial sector institutions. Lastly, I use the Boone 
indicator to measure competition in the financial services sector. Industry competition in the host 
country is likely to have a negative relationship with inward FDI flows, as MNES may be 
hesitant to enter markets that have high levels of competition, making market share capture 
substantially difficult. I include summary statistics of the variables and measures used in this 
study in Table 4.4. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.4 here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 The variable correlations, presented in Table 4.5, indicate that there are no major 
concerns for multicollinearity amongst the variables in this study, as all of the correlations are 
considerably less than 0.8 (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). Additionally the variables produce a mean 
variance inflation factor of 1.26, which is less than the common cutoff point of 10 for detecting 
multicollinearity (Robinson & Schumacker, 2009). 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.5 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
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Therefore, I estimate the following OLS specification indicated in Equation 2 below:  
(2) 
All variables on the right-hand side of the equation are lagged one year in order to minimize the 
threat of serial correlation, help establish causality, and reduce concerns of reverse causation 
(Kennedy, 2009). I implemented a Hausman test that demonstrated correlation between the 
regressors and unobserved effects; therefore, I run the above regression using a fixed effects 
model in order to derive the within estimators. I include country and year fixed effects (not noted 
in Equation 2) in order to control for the time-invariant factors unique to each observation that 
may significantly influence inward FDI flows and bias the coefficient estimates. Additionally, I 
incorporate additional corrections for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in this regression by 
using Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. 
RESULTS 
The main results from the regression equation explained in the previous section are 
displayed in Table 4.6, with Model 1 showing the coefficient estimates of a controls-only 
specification. The national regulations, industry regulations, and self-regulation variables are 
tested individually in Models 2, 3, and 4 respectively, while Model 6 shows the fully nested 
model, which includes all variables of interest.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.6 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
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The control variables in both models provide evidence of their expected effects on inward 
finance FDI (competition is not significant in Model 1, but it is negative). Since the dependent 
variable is a log transformation, I can exponentiate the value of each coefficient estimate to 
interpret the magnitude of its effect on the dependent variable. According to the full model 










The significance of all four control variables in Model 5, along with the goodness of fit measure 
(adjusted R-squared) in Model 1 provide a reasonable level of assurance in the quality of the 
specification of the regression model prior to analyzing the estimates of the independent 
variables. 
Although the hypotheses presented in this study predict a positive relationship between 
the strength of host country regulations and inward FDI in the financial services sector, my 
empirical analysis provides mixed results. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive relationship between 
the strength of host country national-level regulations and inward FDI flows in the financial 
                                                
5	The	coefficient	estimate	is	truncated	in	Table	4.6.	
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services sector. However, Models 2 and 5 in Table 4.6 indicate the exact opposite of Hypothesis 
1. The relationship between national-level regulations in the host country and inward financial 
sector FDI is actually negative and statistically significant. This empirical result indicates that a 
stronger national-level regulatory environment in a host country deters foreign investment flows 
from financial sector MNEs. When looking at the full model (Model 5) a one-unit increase in the 
strength of a host country’s national-level regulations contributes to a 2% decrease in inward 
financial sector FDI flows, which also indicates economic significance.  
 In my second hypothesis, I predict that strong industry regulations under the authority of 
the government increase FDI inflows in the financial services sector. My empirical analysis 
supports this hypothesis, as indicated in Models 3 and 5 in Table 4.6. The coefficient estimate of 
the industry regulation variable in these three models is positive and significant, with a one-unit 
increase in the strength of industry regulations contributing to a 3% increase in inward finance 
FDI flows (as indicated in Model 5). Hypothesis 3, suggests a positive relationship between the 
strength of self-regulation within the industry and FDI inflows. The data, as evidenced in Models 
4, and 5 do not support this hypothesis. When considered in conjunction with industry 
regulations under the authority of the government and national-level regulations in the host 
country (in Model 5), the coefficient estimate is negative, yet statistically insignificant. The 
empirical results indicate that the strength of industry self-regulation in the host country is not a 
significant factor in influencing the amount of FDI inflows in the financial services sector. While 
not the expected result, the lack of a statistically significant effect still stands to advance the 
literature by providing some insight regarding the relevance of the self-regulation versus 
government-regulation debate, particularly in the financial services sector. 
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 In order to establish additional reliability of these results, I tested modified specifications 
of Equation 2; the results of which are displayed in Table 4.7. 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4.7 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Model 1 of Table 4.7 displays the results of testing Equation 2 without the control variables. The 
coefficient estimates of the independent variables maintain the same signs; however the self-
regulation estimate is now statistically significant. My original model incorporates regressors 
that are lagged one year; however, for robustness purposes, I test the model using regressors in 
the same year as the dependent variable in Model 2. The coefficient estimates for all variables 
are robust in the current year; however, the original full model (in Model 5 of Table 4.6) has a 
higher adjusted R-squared value indicating that it fits the data better than the model with no lags.  
I test the robustness of Equation 2 by running a random effects regression (Model 3). 
This specification produces a coefficient estimate for national regulations that is significant but 
the direction of the effect changes from negative to positive. The estimate for industry 
regulations changes to negative and lacks statistical significance, and self-regulation actually 
presents a positive and significant effect. Overall, the results from the random effects 
specification are largely opposite of those in Model 5 of Table 4.6, which is not entirely 
surprising since the Hausman test indicates that the random effects estimator is significantly 
different from the fixed effects estimator. 
Lastly, I use bureaucratic quality as an alternative measure for national regulations to test 
the robustness of the estimation results. Bureaucratic quality is a variable measured in the 
International Country Risk Guide, and is defined as the institutional strength and quality of the 
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government bureaucracy. Higher values of bureaucratic quality suggest that government 
bureaucrats have the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services6. Models 4 and 5 in Table 4.7 display the results of testing 
the effect of bureaucratic quality individually and within the fully nested model, respectively. 
The empirical results are robust, and further corroborate the significantly negative relationship 
between national-level regulations and inward FDI flows. 
DISCUSSION 
 This study contributes to the institutions and internationalization literature by examining 
not only how the strength of host country institutions matters in the context of attracting FDI, but 
also how authority over those institutions matters. I test the general predictions of the new 
institutional economics perspective on firm internationalization on various types of host country 
regulations. Specifically, I empirically examine the extent to which host country regulations at 
different levels (i.e., national-level and industry-level regulations), and under public and private 
authority attract inward FDI flows in the financial services sector. Findings from this research 
suggest that regulations that fall under the purview of the state significantly affect inward FDI 
flows; however, the effects differ when examining regulations at different levels. When 
considering regulations that govern the activities of actors across all industries in a host country, 
greater strength deters inward financial sector FDI. On the other hand, regulations that are also 
under the authority of the government, yet specifically targeted towards the financial services 
sector tend to attract inward FDI in this sector as the strength of these regulations increases. The 
analysis in this study also shows that the strength of industry self-regulation programs in the host 
country does not have any significant effect on inward financial sector FDI. Thus, this study 
                                                
6	Bureaucratic	quality	definition	retrieved	from	The	PRS	Group.	
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shows that inward FDI does not respond to all host country regulations in the same way (as 
implied by new institutional economics), which further emphasizes the importance of 
disentangling regulatory environments amongst several dimensions (e.g., levels and authority). 
 Many international business scholars agree that the strength of host country regulatory 
environments significantly influences inward FDI flows; however, results from this study add 
further support to those who believe that MNE managers do not find stronger regulations 
economically attractive. I propose that stronger host country regulations at the national level 
would attract FDI flows due to the association of stronger regulations with higher economic 
development, a strong financial system, and greater confidence in the standards to which 
potential customers of financial services firms would be held. However, the empirical results 
from this study indicate that there are different mechanisms at play that contribute to the 
significant and negative relationship between the strength of national-level regulations in the host 
country and financial sector FDI inflows. One potential explanation for this relationship may be 
the fact that when regulations imposed on domestic firms are strong, this may signal to MNEs 
that they too will be subject to strong, and perhaps stronger, regulations given their foreign 
status, which contributes to a firm’s liability of foreignness (Hennart, 1982; Hymer 1976 [1960]; 
Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). Reid & Toffel (2009) explain that when firms share an 
institutional field (e.g., operating in the same country) with other firms threatened by existing 
regulations, they are likely to view themselves as the target of future regulations.  
 Strong national-level regulations may also be economically unattractive to MNEs that 
have the objective of taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities in a race to the bottom (Spar & 
Yoffie, 1999) due to cross-national differences in regulatory environments. MNEs, particularly 
in the financial services sector, may engage in internationalization pursuits in order to escape 
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strong regulations in the home country and take advantage of potential opportunities that may 
result from lax regulations in the host country (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Some empirical studies 
that support this idea, such as a study by Fung, Yau, and Zhang (2011), which provides evidence 
that Chinese firms’ investment decisions in Hong Kong are largely implemented to take 
advantage of differential tax incentives. Additionally, in a study of cross-border bank M&As, 
Dong, Song, and Tao (2011) find that banks make foreign investment decisions based on the 
potential to exercise regulatory arbitrage by expanding into less regulated countries. 
 The empirical analysis in this study supports my hypothesis that managers of financial 
sector MNEs are more likely to invest in host countries with governments that adequately 
regulate the financial services industry. Government actors help ensure that the playing field in 
the industry is level for domestic and foreign firms, and help minimize the presence of market 
imperfections and trade barriers within the industry that may be viewed as economically 
unattractive to an MNE. The power and access to certain resources that government actors have 
may also be economically attractive to MNEs, particularly in the financial services sector, as 
these characteristics may provide additional assurance that the host country government may also 
serve as a credible source of assistance in the event of a financial crisis. In addition, due to 
globalization of the financial services sector, government-regulations of the industry are more 
likely to be aligned across countries than industry self-regulation programs. 
 Surprisingly, the empirical findings from this study suggest that industry self-regulation 
has no statistically significant effect on the foreign investment decisions of managers in the 
financial services sector. This empirical result suggests that the self-regulation versus 
government-regulation debate is seemingly inconsequential in some contexts. MNE managers 
may not place a substantial amount of meaning in self-regulation when making FDI investment 
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decisions due to lack of confidence in the sincerity and authenticity of regulations created by 
peers (King & Toffel, 2009). Furthermore, there may be heterogeneity in the operational 
meaning of self-regulation across borders (Wotruba, 1997), causing MNE managers to place 
little to no significance on these initiatives in a potential host country. 
Contributions 
 The empirical findings from this study contribute to the literature on institutions and FDI 
by exploring how host country institutions at different levels influence inward FDI, and 
subsequently showing that the effects of different institutions are not necessarily the same. While 
researchers have lamented about the lack of knowledge and inconsistent findings regarding 
which types of institutions matter in attracting or deterring FDI (Holmes et al., 2011), the effect 
of institutions and authority over the institutions at different levels has been largely 
underexplored. MNEs must contend with and strategize around different types of institutions 
simultaneously when engaging in international business activities. As such, Zhou and Peng 
(2010) specifically emphasize that more research examining institutional structures at different 
levels is needed, as this is a weak link in the existing literature. My study attempts to address 
these calls by showing the importance of testing the influences of different types of institutions 
on inward FDI. 
 This study also contributes to the literature on self-regulation, particularly in terms of 
effectiveness, which is something still highly questioned amongst researchers (Wotruba, 1997; 
Lenox & Nash, 2003). The empirical test of the effectiveness of industry self-regulation in the 
context of attracting FDI in this study is also itself a contribution. Existing research on industry 
self-regulation is largely based on case studies. Although these case studies have made 
substantial contributions to theory and our general understanding of different types of 
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regulations, many researchers agree that in order for theories of self-regulation to advance, there 
is a need for more empirical tests (King & Toffel, 2009). 
Limitations 
 Although, this study offers contributions to extant literatures, there are some data and 
methodology limitations that should be acknowledged, as they may also serve as motivation for 
future research. The extent of my analysis is limited to examining one side of FDI flows (flows 
into the host country), as the FDI data retrieved from UNCTAD only have information on the 
host country and the amount of flows into that country in a specific year. In the event that more 
data become accessible, I encourage other researchers to examine the country-pair relationships 
of FDI flows and how they are influenced by the strength of regulations and regulatory authority. 
Additionally, there are innate limitations when incorporating the Heritage Foundation’s 
Economic Freedom Index for my measures of national regulations. Although the Economic 
Freedom Index is widely used in research across various disciplines, it is also criticized for being 
conservatively biased and one-sided in its definitions of ‘freedom.’ While I include a robustness 
check with an alternative measure of national regulations, I encourage other researchers to 
incorporate other robust measures of the strength of national level regulations. I would also 
encourage researchers to incorporate firm-level data to provide better insight into how certain 
MNE characteristics (e.g., internationalization experience and geographic location of 
subsidiaries) may moderate the relationships between regulations and FDI. 
 I also recognize the fact that grounding my study in one specific industry presents 
generalizability concerns across different contexts. However, I should point out that there are 
some benefits to testing theories in one industry. For example, by using one industry, I do not 
have to be concerned with unobserved heterogeneity across industries in my empirical model. In 
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addition, using one industry enables the use of more precise measures for the variables in my 
model that are more appropriate for the financial services sector (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990). 
Nonetheless, other researchers are encouraged to apply this study in other industries to see how 
the results fare in other service industries and manufacturing sectors, or to see if the industry 
somehow moderates the relationship between regulations and FDI.  
Suggestions for future research 
 Although this study shows how national-level regulations influence FDI flows when all 
other regulations are held constant, future research should examine the interaction between the 
strength of supranational, national-level, and industry-level institutions since, in reality, 
institutions do not operate in isolation (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, & Levine, 2003; King & Toffel, 
2009). Delmas (2009), for example, questions the significance and effectiveness of industry self-
regulation in the context of countries with poor regulatory environments at the national-level. 
Likewise, Garvin (1983), Gunningham and Rees (1997), and Short and Toffel (2010) attest that 
good national-level regulations and enforcement mechanisms are still needed in order for self-
regulation to be effective and produce socially desirable results. Therefore, other researchers may 
want to contribute to the call for more research examining the interaction of institutions (Ang, 
Benischke, & Doh, 2015; Zhou & Peng, 2010) by investigating how the effect that one 
institution has on FDI is moderated by the strength of the greater institutional environment in 
which it is embedded. 
 Additionally, researchers may find it interesting to engage in further examination of the 
division of regulatory authority of multinational financial services firms. Specifically, 
researchers can investigate how much authority should be allocated to host and home country 
authorities over an MNE’s branches in other countries, which continues to be a practical and 
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theoretical debate (Boyer & Ponce, 2012). Along similar lines, future research can examine 
whether government or private actors most effectively regulate specific activities and operations. 
CONCLUSION 
 The strength of host country institutions has a significant effect on inward FDI flows. 
This study, however, empirically shows that the effect on FDI differs when considering 
institutions at different levels and under the authority of different actors. My analysis of the 
global financial services sector suggests host countries with weaker national-level regulations 
and countries with stronger financial sector regulations under the authority of the government 
encourage FDI from financial sector MNEs. Financial sector regulations in the host country 
under the authority of private actors within the industry do not appear to have an effect on 
MNEs’ investment decisions. This study encourages scholars in the institutions and FDI 
literature to examine different types of institutions and to also consider who has authority over, 
and monitors compliance with these institutions. By considering these additional factors, 
scholars may find it necessary to adapt the mechanisms and predictions offered by traditionally 
accepted internationalization theories. There are also implications for MNEs and firms that may 
be involved in setting industry regulations and standards. Host countries with strong industry and 
lax national-level regulations may provide favorable environments for foreign investment 
decisions. However, self-regulation initiatives in the host country are seemingly not major 
factors to consider when making FDI decisions. As such, any anti-foreign investment agendas 
that local host country firms may want to pursue through self-regulation may be futile.  
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Table 4.1 Variables and Measures 
 
Variable Measure Data Source 
Inward FDI Natural log of inward FDI flows into finance 
industry (millions USD) 
UNCTAD 
   National Regulations Regulatory efficiency sub-index of the 
Economic Freedom Index. Values can fall in a 
range of 0 (low efficiency) to 100 (high 
efficiency) 
The Heritage Foundation’s 
Economic Freedom Index 
   Industry Regulations Combination of five categories from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Database: Bank 
Activities, Conglomerates; Capital; Competition, 
and Supervisory Action. Values can be equal to 
or greater than 8, with higher values indicating 
stronger government-regulations. 
Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Database (Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine, 2013) 
   Self-Regulation Private Monitoring category from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Database, which 
measures the extent to which there are 
incentives/ability for the private monitoring of 
firms. Values can fall within the range of 0 to 12 
with higher values indicating more private 
monitoring. 
Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Database (Barth, 
Caprio, & Levine, 2013) 
   GDP Growth Annual GDP growth rate (%) World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
   Exchange Rate The exchange rate determined by national 
authorities or to the rate determined in the 
legally sanctioned exchange market. It is 
calculated as an annual average based on 
monthly averages (local currency units relative 
to the U.S. dollar). 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
   Financial Development Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of 
GDP).  
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
   Competition Boone indicator, which is calculated as the 
elasticity of profits to marginal costs. I rescaled 
this measure so that an increase in the Boone 
indicator implies an increase in the competitive 
conduct of financial intermediaries. 
Global Financial 
Development Database 
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Table 4.2 Regulatory Efficiency Sub-Index and its Factors 
 
Regulatory Efficiency 
Factor Description Range of Values 
Business Freedom Quantitative measure of the 
ability to start, operate, and 
close a business. This 
represents the overall burden 
of regulation as well as the 
efficiency of government in 
the regulatory process. 
0 (not free) to 100 (freest) 
Labor Freedom Quantitative measure that 
looks into various aspects of 
the legal and regulatory 
framework of a country’s 
labor market. It provides 
cross-country data on 
regulations concerning 
minimum wages, laws 
inhibiting layoffs, severance 
requirements, and measurable 
regulatory burdens on hiring, 
hours, etc. 
0 (not free) to 100 (freest) 
Monetary Freedom Combines a measure of price 
stability with an assessment of 
price controls. Both inflation 
and price controls distort 
market activity. Price stability 
without microeconomic 
intervention is the ideal state 
for the free market. 
0 (not free) to 100 (freest) 
Note: Information retrieved from the Index of Economic Freedom website: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/regulatory-efficiency 
 100 
Table 4.3 Five Categories Within Industry Regulations Measure 
 
Industry Regulations 
Category Description Range of Values 
Banking Activity Regulations Extent to which banks may 
engage in securities, 
insurance, and real estate 
activities. 
3 (less restrictive)  
              to  
12 (more restrictive) 
Financial Conglomerate 
Regulations 
Extent to which banks may 
own and control nonfinancial 
firms, nonfinancial firms may 
own and control banks, and 
nonbank financial firms may 
own and control banks. 
3 (less restrictive)  
              to  
12 (more restrictive) 
Competition Regulations Degree of difficulty in 
obtaining approval to enter the 
banking sector (for domestic 
and foreign firms). 
0 (less restrictive)  
              to  
15 (more restrictive) 
Capital Regulations Extent to which capital 
requirements reflect certain 
risk elements, and whether 
certain funds may be used to 
capitalize a bank. 
0 (less stringent)  
              to  
10 (more stringent) 
Supervisory Action 
Regulations 
Extent of power given to 
supervisory authorities to take 
specific actions to intervene in 
bank activities, restructure and 
reorganized a troubled bank, 
and declare a bank insolvent. 
Also measures the degree to 
which the courts dominate 
supervisory authority. 
2 (less powerful)  
               to  
no max (more powerful) 
Note: Information retrieved from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008)
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Table 4.4 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Inward FDI 5.92 2.37 -11.51 11.70 
National 
Regulations 70.45 9.80 27.5 96.53 
Industry 
Regulations 49.50 6.52 29 68 
Self-Regulation 7.99 1.44 4 11 
GDP Growth 4.08 4.15 -13.81 33.74 
Exchange Rate 370.12 1264.29 0.31 10461.24 
Financial 
Development 58.25 48.26 1.12 311.78 





Table 4.5 Correlation Matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Inward FDI 1        
2 National Regulations 0.36 1       
3 Industry Regulations -0.02 -0.08 1      
4 Self-Regulation 0.24 0.33 0.12 1     
5 GDP Growth -0.14 -0.22 0.06 -0.03 1    
6 Exchange Rate -0.00 -0.16 0.34 0.04 0.07 1   
7 Financial Development 0.37 0.54 -0.21 0.20 -0.24 -0.15 1  
8 Competition -0.02 -0.02 -0.19 -0.16 0.02 -0.08 0.06 1 
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Table 4.6 Regression Results for Inward Finance FDI Flows 
 
Inward FDI 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
National Regulations t-1  -0.02**   -0.02* 
   (0.01)   (0.01) 
Industry Regulations t-1   0.02*  0.03*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01) 
Self-Regulation t-1    0.02 -0.04 
     (0.06) (0.03) 
GDP Growth t-1 0.05** 0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Exchange Rate t-1 -0.000** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
  (0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Development t-1 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Competition t-1 -0.33 -0.39 -1.27** -0.40 -1.21** 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.40) (0.33) (0.42) 
Constant 4.54*** 6.36*** 3.27*** 4.52*** 4.67*** 
  (0.19) (0.64) (0.62) (0.51) (1.10) 
       
Observations 669 656 473 553 450 
No. of Countries 82 82 72 77 72 
Adj. R-squared 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.80 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 104 
Table 4.7 Robustness Analysis 
 
Inward Finance FDI 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
National Regulations t-1 -0.02*  0.04*   
 (0.01)  (0.02)   
Bureaucratic Quality t-1    -0.69* -0.96*** 
    (0.33) (0.20) 
Industry Regulations t-1 0.03***  -0.00  0.03** 
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Self-Regulation t-1 -0.04  0.17*  -0.04 
 (0.03)  (0.10)  (0.03) 
GDP Growth t-1 0.04***  -0.01 0.05** 0.05*** 
 (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Exchange Rate t-1 -0.00***  0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Financial Development t-1 0.02***  0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Competition t-1 -1.21**  -0.24 -0.79*** -1.28*** 
 (0.42)  (0.41) (0.25) (0.40) 
National Regulations t  -0.03**    
  (0.01)    
Industry Regulations t  0.03**    
  (0.01)    
Self-Regulation t  -0.07    
  (0.04)    
GDP Growth t  0.04**    
  (0.01)    
Exchange Rate t  -0.00***    
  (0.00)    
Financial Development t  0.02***    
  (0.00)    
Competition t  0.51    
  (0.55)    
Constant 4.67*** 6.83*** 0.94 6.35*** 6.02*** 
 (1.10) (1.36) (0.53) (0.83) (0.79) 
      
Observations 450 490 450 593 407 
No. of Countries 72 72 72 73 64 
Adj. R-squared 0.80 0.78 0.21 0.78 0.78 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of industry self-
regulation, particularly within the context of the global financial services sector. Globalization 
and the escalation of firms’ cross-border activities over the last few decades have made global 
governance and coordinating industry regulations across borders necessary. However, national 
governments are limited in their capacity to regulate firms outside of their jurisdictions. As such, 
firms and other private industry actors have assumed roles as pseudo-regulators in setting 
standards and monitoring business activities within their respective industries domestically and 
internationally. This web of public and private regulators at national, regional, and international 
levels has created a complex global regulatory environment that involves and influences firms; 
however, there is limited research that theoretically and empirically recognizes this complexity. 
Specifically, there is a dearth of understanding of the extent to which firms and governments 
complement or substitute each other within the global regulatory framework. In addition, there is 
substantial cross-disciplinary debate regarding the effectiveness of industry self-regulation in 
relation to government-regulation; however, these debates have led to few empirical studies to 
test the conjectures of scholars, practitioners, and policymakers on different sides of the debate.  
The three essays in this dissertation contribute to the international business (IB) and self-
regulation literatures by explaining how the study of self-regulation can be nested within IB 
research and by suggesting various research streams for researchers to explore in order to 
provide more insight into the regulatory activities of firms and other nongovernmental entities. 
Additionally, this dissertation offers additional insights regarding the effectiveness of self-
regulation. I provide a summary of the research questions in each dissertation essay and the main 
empirical findings in Table 5.1. 
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-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5.1 
-------------------------------- 
While various researchers have examined the phenomenon of industry self-regulation as 
well as its comparison in terms of effectiveness to government-regulations for several decades, 
results from these studies do not allow us to draw highly conclusive insights regarding the 
subject matter for two main reasons. First, there is a lack of consensus regarding what it means to 
be effective; second, much of this research is based on case studies focused on one specific 
industry (usually chemical, energy, or healthcare) that typically examine one or a few firms. IB 
scholars in particular have made limited contributions to the government-regulation versus self-
regulation debate; which is concerning since the increase in self-regulation programs worldwide 
has been attributed in large part to globalization and MNE activity.  
Essay 1 reviews the literature debating the effectiveness of government-regulation and 
industry self-regulation, showing that much of the debate can be grouped into three categories: 
(1) whether public or private actors should be responsible for setting industry rules and 
standards; (2) whether public or private actors are better at regulatory enforcement; and (3) the 
outcomes and effectiveness of government-regulation and self-regulation. Following this review, 
I situate this debate within the IB discipline by providing an example of how the effectiveness of 
government-regulation and self-regulation can be examined within the context of attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the global financial services industry. Finally, I propose an 
agenda for future self-regulation research within the IB discipline that encourages scholars to: (1) 
explore the significance of contextual factors in self-regulation research; (2) more precisely 
examine effectiveness; and (3) increase quantitative empirical research of self-regulation. 
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Public and private organizations have assumed roles in regulating business activities 
domestically and internationally, which has resulted in the formation of a complex global 
regulatory environment (Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Vogel, 2010). Scholars across various 
disciplines have attempted to increase our understanding of this complex regulatory 
environment; however, there are still many unanswered questions about the relationship between 
government-regulation and self-regulation, as well as the effectiveness of each type of 
regulation. Essay 2 examines the nature of the relationship between industry government-
regulation and self-regulation as well as the effectiveness of each type of regulation when 
responding to a major economic crisis. Using cross-national financial sector regulatory data from 
2001-2013 and the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, I find that: (1) there is no evidence that 
self-regulation tends to precede government-regulation (there is no causal relationship between 
the two); (2) there is no evidence of a complementary or substitutive relationship between 
government-regulation and self-regulation (3) government-regulation tends to strengthen in 
response to a crisis; (4) self-regulation tends to respond just as quickly (and in some cases 
quicker) to a crisis as government-regulation; (5) however, self-regulation tends to weaken in 
response to a crisis. These findings do not support previous anecdotal claims about the nature of 
the relationship between government-regulation and self-regulation. However, these empirical 
findings do suggest that we cannot place too much reliance on firms to actively and adequately 
regulate their industries, particularly during turbulent economic conditions. 
IB scholars tend to agree that host country institutions have a significant effect on inward 
FDI flows (Bevan, Estrin, & Meyer, 2004; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Xing & 
Kolstad, 2002); however, much of this research is focused on institutions at the national level. In 
reality, MNEs must engage with various types of institutions across borders and at different 
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levels. In addition to contending with regulations at various levels, MNEs also operate under 
different types of regulatory authority, particularly at the industry level; namely, industry 
government-regulation and self-regulation. While there is a large, established literature on the 
institutional determinants of inward FDI, we still have a limited understanding of how various 
regulatory environments influence foreign investment decisions, particularly in the financial 
services sector. Accordingly, Essay 3 examines the effectiveness of the strength of host country 
national-level regulations, industry-level (government) regulations, and industry-self-regulation 
in attracting FDI in the global financial services sector. Using inward financial sector FDI flow 
data in 82 countries during the years 2001-2013, I find that: (1) host countries with weaker 
national-level regulations and countries with stronger industry-level regulations under the 
authority of the government encourage FDI within the financial sector; and (2) self-regulation in 
the host country does not have a statistically significant effect on financial sector inward FDI. 
These empirical findings suggest that regulatory strength and regulatory authority matter in the 
context of attracting inward FDI in the financial services sector; however, the relevance of self-
regulation is still questionable. 
LIMITATIONS 
 While this dissertation offers notable insights into underexplored areas of self-regulation 
in the global financial services sector, there are some limitations, which can potentially be 
addressed with future research. The main, and likely most obvious limitation in this dissertation 
is the use of one industry. Testing hypotheses only within the context of the financial sector may 
present some generalizability concerns; however, this is a common limitation in industry self-
regulation research since these regulations are typically industry-specific. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that the benefits of exploring self-regulation in the financial services sector provide 
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benefits that outweigh the limitations. By using one industry, I do not have to be concerned with 
unobserved heterogeneity across industries in my empirical models. In addition, using one 
industry enables the use of more precise measures for the variables in my models that are more 
appropriate for the financial services sector (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990). However, I encourage 
researchers to find empirically sound approaches to include additional industries into one study 
to increase our knowledge of the self-regulation across various contexts.  
 Another limitation of this dissertation is that it does not provide analysis at the firm level. 
While the findings in this dissertation provide valuable insights into the effectiveness of industry 
self-regulation and how it fits within the overall global regulatory environment, management 
scholars would greatly benefit from analyses that show how managers utilize self-regulation in 
firm strategies and how that translates into firm performance. In relation to Essay 3, firm-level 
data may provide better insight into how certain MNE characteristics (e.g., internationalization 
experience and geographic location of subsidiaries) may moderate the relationships between 
regulations and FDI. Although my dissertation is limited to primarily country- and industry-level 
data, future research should conduct self-regulation research at the firm level to increase our 
understanding of the topic and identify specific implications for managers. 
 Essay 3 in particular suffers from data limitations, as my analysis is limited to examining 
one side of FDI flows (flows into the host country). The FDI data from UNCTAD only have 
information on the host country and the amount of flows into that country in a specific year. 
Therefore, in the event that more data become accessible, I encourage IB researchers to examine 
the country-pair relationships of FDI flows and how they are influenced by the strength of 




 This dissertation offers contributions to the literature on self-regulation, in addition to the 
international business discipline, with specific contributions to the literature on institutions and 
FDI. In Essay 1, I illuminate the relevance of self-regulation research to the IB discipline, and 
carve out a research agenda for other IB scholars to contribute discipline-specific insights to the 
study of self-regulation in order to increase our understanding of it. I specifically make the case 
for increased research on self-regulation amongst firms in the financial services sector, as this is 
one of the primary mechanisms used to govern these institutions across borders.  
 Essay 2 acknowledges the complexity of the global regulatory environment in the 
financial services sector, and subsequently provides useful insights into the functioning of this 
regulatory environment. Specifically, this study contributes to the literature on industry self-
regulation by increasing our understanding of how firms and other private organizations regulate 
their industries during stable and volatile economic conditions. While much of the existing 
literature on self-regulation debates its overall regulatory effectiveness, few studies actually put 
it to the test using a major exogenous shock like an economic crisis. There are also several 
studies that speak to the nature of the relationship between government-regulation and self-
regulation; however these claims tend to be backed by anecdotal and historical accounts. Essay 2 
contributes to the research in these studies by using quantitative empirical methods with data 
spanning multiple countries and years, to show that there is not widespread evidence of self-
regulation preceding government-regulation (and vice versa) in the financial services sector; thus 
debunking a commonly held belief. I also do not corroborate empirically that government-
regulation and self-regulation are complements or substitutes, even though there is a common 
belief that the two types of regulations are related.  
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 The empirical findings in Essay 3 contribute to the broad literature on institutions and 
FDI by exploring how host country institutions at different levels influence inward FDI, and 
subsequently showing that the effects of different institutions are not necessarily the same. These 
findings illustrate the importance of testing the influences of different types of institutions on 
FDI in future research in order to model more accurately the fact that MNEs simultaneously 
interact with different types of institutions. Essay 3 also contributes to the literature on industry 
self-regulation effectiveness, but specifically testing its ability to attract FDI in the financial 
services sector. Existing research on self-regulation is largely based on case studies. Although 
these case studies have made substantial contributions to theory and our general understanding of 
different types of regulations, many researchers agree that there is a need for more quantitative 
empirical tests in order for self-regulation theories to advance (King & Toffel 2009). 
 Although existing research provides substantial support for incorporating self-regulation 
into the regulatory architecture (especially on an international level) to some degree, the 
empirical findings from this dissertation suggest that self-regulation may not necessarily be 
worthy of all of its praises, and thus should be approached cautiously. Implications for 
policymakers suggest that they should be welcoming, but also critical about the extent to which 
regulatory authority is placed into the hands of those being regulated. Self-regulation appears to 
be an insignificant factor in inward FDI decisions, even though traditional IB theories suggest 
institutions matter and play a significant role in FDI strategies. Finally, when faced with crises 
and other unstable circumstances, we may not be able to assume that firms will continue to 
prioritize voluntary regulation and oversight. Nevertheless, there are many opportunities for 
researchers to dive deeper into this stream of research and potentially make a better case for the 
practical implementation of industry self-regulation.  
 112 
Table 5.1 Summaries of Dissertation Findings 
Essay Research Questions Main Findings 
Essay 1: Entering the Debate: The Effectiveness of 
Industry Self-Regulation in the Context of 
Financial Sector Foreign Direct Investment 
What insights can be gathered from the existing 
debate on industry government-regulation and self-
regulation? How can international business scholars 
contribute to this debate? 
• The debate can be categorized into 
research on standards-setting, 
enforcement, and outcomes/effectiveness 
• International business scholars can 
contribute to this debate by exploring the 
significance of contextual factors, 
precisely examining degree of 
effectiveness, and increasing empirical 
research 
Essay 2: The Relationship Between Financial 
Sector Government-Regulation and Self-Regulation 
and Their Response to the Global Financial Crisis 
To what extent does self-regulation precede 
industry government-regulation? To what extent is 
the relationship between industry government-
regulation and self-regulation complementary or 
substitutive? How does each type of regulation 
respond to an economic crisis, and to what extent is 
one type of regulation more responsive to an 
economic crisis as compared to the other? 
• There is no evidence that self-regulation 
precedes government-regulation (there is 
no evidence of a causal relationship) 
• There is no evidence of a complementary 
or substitutive relationship between 
government-regulation and self-regulation, 
• Government-regulation tends to strengthen 
in response to a crisis 
• Self-regulation tends to respond just as 
quickly (and perhaps quicker) to a crisis as 
government-regulation 
• Self-regulation tends to weaken in 
response to a crisis 
Essay 3: Regulations, Regulatory Authority, and 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Global Financial 
Services Sector 
To what extent are host country national-level 
regulations, industry-level regulations, and industry 
self-regulation effective at attracting foreign direct 
investment in the financial services sector? 
• Stronger national-level regulations deter 
inward financial sector FDI flows 
• Stronger industry-level regulations 
encourage inward financial sector FDI 
flows 
• Self-regulation does not have a significant 
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